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Abstract 
 
Unfunded employee pension obligations will present a serious fiscal problem to state and local 
governments in the not too distant future.  This article takes a looks at the causes and potential 
cures for the public pension mess, mainly through the lens of legal doctrines that limit public 
employers’ ability to avoid obligations.  As far as the causes are concerned, this article examines 
the political environment within which public pension promises are made and funded, as an 
attempt to understand how this occurred.  The article then turns to ask if states could implement 
meaningful reforms without violating either state or federal law.  In particular, the article looks at 
state balanced budget requirements, state constitutional provisions regarding public employee 
pensions, and federal constitutional law, and asks whether states could significantly reduce their 
pension promises to public employees without violating the law.  The entire analysis must also 
be informed by the concerns of the employees and retirees whose perhaps sole source of 
retirement income would be reduced by changes in benefit levels.  The article concludes with 
remarks placing the matter in that context, raising the possibility of a bailout to ameliorate the 
possibly disastrous consequences of reform to public employees and retirees.  
Electronic copy available at: http://ssrn.com/abstract=2131481
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The Public Pension Crisis 
Jack M. Beermann
*
 
The first decade of the new millennium was a difficult one for state and local government 
finances, and the second decade has started out even worse.  In addition to the difficulty 
governments at all levels are experiencing in trying to maintain services without raising taxes, 
some analysts claim that many state and local governments are sitting on a fiscal time bomb;  —
underfunded public employee pension and health care liabilities
1
 that threaten to destroy the 
fiscal well-being of many state and local governments.  Some accounts predict that absent 
significant benefits reductions (which may not be legally feasible), state and local governments 
will soon be devoting an untenably large portion of their budgets to making pension payments 
and satisfying other obligations to retired workers. 
Unfunded liabilities are possible because government pensions are still largely defined 
benefit plans, and the law generally does not require full advance funding of the projected costs 
of accrued benefits.  In a defined benefit plan, an employee is promised a specific dollar amount 
of retirement benefits, usually based on the employee’s final salary.  These promises are often 
accompanied by promises of lifetime government-financed health care, without regard to the cost 
to the public employer.  Although states operate under balanced budget requirements, it turns out 
                                                 
*
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the ins and outs of municipal bankruptcy.  For excellent research assistance, I thank Bryn Sfetsios, Boston 
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Matt Martin and Erin Monju, both of Harvard Law School class of 2012.  © Jack M. Beermann, 2012, all rights 
reserved. 
1
This article focuses primarily on unfunded pension liabilities.  State and local governments also have substantial 
unfunded health care liabilities, and a few distinct aspects of that problem are highlighted in this article. 
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that underfunding pension obligations does not violate these state law requirements.  Thus, 
current taxpayers are able to push off pension and other promises to retirees to future generations 
of taxpayers. 
Private industry has moved away from defined benefit plans toward contribution plans, 
under which employers contribute a fixed amount to an employee’s retirement plan and the 
employee receives retirement benefits based on the performance of the investments purchased 
with the contributions.  The advantage of a contribution plan to employers is obvious—certainty.  
Once an employer makes the contributions required under the plan, there is no chance that 
actuarial miscalculations or market downturns will require additional contributions in the future.  
The employee, not the employer, bears the risk of a market downturn or inflation that might 
reduce the value of the pension.   
Defined contribution plans also have some advantages for employees. First, employees 
may gain control over their funds and have the power to direct investments to their preferred 
level of risk.  Second, employees’ retirement funds are not subject to the solvency of the 
employer.  There is no opportunity for employers to manipulate contribution levels.  Further, 
once the employer’s money is deposited into the account, the employer cannot raid the fund or 
take any other action that would prejudice the employees’ ownership of the fund.2 
While most public employers and employees in the United States set aside money each 
year to fund future projected pension obligations, many public pension plans are seriously 
                                                 
2
 This is not to say that private contribution retirement plans are risk free, but federal regulation under ERISA 
prevents private companies from failing to make required payments.  Employees may suffer if their plan is 
terminated due to the insolvency of the employer or the inability or unwillingness of the employer to continue to 
contribute, but past contributions are largely safe in private plans. 
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underfunded either intentionally or due to unrealistic assumptions concerning investment 
performance and the amount that will be owed over time.  This means that unless contributions 
are increased substantially, future pension payments to retired government workers will be made, 
at least in part, from current revenues.  The problem is thought to be so serious that some local 
governments may be effectively insolvent.  Retirees face the risk of reduced pension payments 
and current employees face the risk of receiving less generous retirement benefits than the 
promises that they have been depending upon. 
In the private sector, ERISA
3
 and programs administered by the Pension Benefit 
Guaranty Corporation provide a mechanism to deal with insolvent pension plans and the 
outstanding pension obligations of bankrupt private firms.
4
  The financial consequences of 
pension plan insolvency to private companies and their employees may be disastrous, but 
ultimately they can be resolved in an orderly manner without forcing the company to pay all of 
its obligations.  State and local governments have fewer options.  State law and the Contract 
Clause of the United States Constitution may make it impossible for states to enact meaningful 
pension reform or simply discharge obligations that are too difficult to meet.  Even if a state is 
insolvent, the federal Constitution may demand complete payment of all pension obligations.  
Bankruptcy may be an option for municipalities, but that is a very drastic step, not open to all 
municipalities, and is not available to the states themselves. 
                                                 
3
 Employee Retirement Income Security Act of 1974, 29 U.S.C. §§ 1001-1461.  ERISA makes underfunding of 
private pension liabilities unlawful. 
4
 For a suggestion that ERISA be extended to state and local pensions, see Jon G. Miller, Is Your Client’s 
Government Pension Safe?: Making the Case for Federal Regulation, 2 ELDER L.J. 121 (1994). 
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Even if everyone agreed that the best option would be to move away from defined benefit 
plans to defined contribution plans, implementing this change could be difficult because of the 
magnitude of unfunded liabilities.  If paying current retirees’ benefits depends on contributions 
from active government employees and current tax revenues, it may be impossible to move 
current employees to contribution plans without magnifying the crisis beyond manageability.  
The public pension crisis raises three separate concerns.  The first involves the potential 
fiscal disaster that some predict will occur years from now, when public employers are required 
to pay the pension benefits they have been promising to public employees for many years.  The 
second concern is the reduction in government services that may be necessary to make these 
payments, which could lead to great taxpayer dissatisfaction and political instability.  The third 
concern involves the consequences to public employees and retirees, especially those who did 
not participate in Social Security, who could be left with insufficient assets for a decent 
retirement. 
Underfunding public pensions is in substance, if not in form, an example of deficit 
spending in which current taxpayers enjoy the benefits of government services while pushing off 
some of the costs to future taxpayers.  It’s a double whammy for those future taxpayers— they 
will not only be required to pay for the consumption of prior generations, but will also receive 
reduced government services as state and local governments allocate funds to pensions and 
health care for retired workers rather than services for current taxpayers  
It should be noted that some analysts deny that there is a crisis in public pension costs 
looming just over the horizon. In their view, the total unfunded pension and health care liability 
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of state and local governments is relatively small when compared to the overall revenues of state 
and local government.  They also point out that average pension earned by retired government 
workers is small—under $20,000 per year.  On this view, the “pension” crisis is an effort by 
conservative political forces to undermine public employee unions whose members tend to 
support liberal politicians and views. 
Although the matter is not free from doubt, this article proceeds on the assumption that 
there is at least some truth to the conclusion reached by many, that pension obligations will 
present a serious fiscal problem in the not too distant future.  This article takes a looks at the 
causes and potential cures for the public pension mess, mainly through the lens of legal doctrines 
that limit public employers’ ability to avoid obligations.  As far as the causes are concerned, this 
article examines the political environment within which public pension promises are made and 
funded, as an attempt to understand how this occurred.  The first issue here is whether the 
promises governments have made to public employees are extravagant in light of their pay, 
benefits, job security and opportunities for advancement of state and local government workers 
as compared to workers in private industry.  The article then turns to ask if states could 
implement meaningful reforms without violating either state or federal law.  In particular, the 
article looks at state balanced budget requirements, state constitutional provisions regarding 
public employee pensions, and federal constitutional law, and asks whether states could 
significantly reduce their pension promises to public employees without violating the law.  The 
entire analysis must also be informed by the concerns of the employees and retirees whose 
perhaps sole source of retirement income would be reduced by changes in benefit levels.  The 
article concludes with remarks placing the matter in that context, raising the possibility of a 
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bailout to ameliorate the possibly disastrous consequences of reform to public employees and 
retirees. 
I. The political economy of public pensions 
There are at least three separate issues regarding the political economy of public pension 
funding.  First is the basic question of whether unfunded retirement promises to government 
workers constitute a fiscal crisis or whether the issue has been created as a means of attacking 
public employee unions or generally attempting to reduce compensation to public workers.
5
  The 
second issue concerns the nature of retirement promises to government workers: i.e., are the 
promises excessive and subject to manipulation and abuse, or are they simply part of a perhaps 
generous, but reasonable overall, compensation package?  The final issue is, assuming that 
public employee retirement benefits are excessive or subject to abuse, how did this happen: i.e., 
why would elected officials provide excessive retirement benefits to government employees? 
A. How Large is the Potential Fiscal Problem? 
                                                 
5
 Attention to the underfunding of public pensions is not new.  An early hint at the forthcoming crisis was a 1976 
Harvard Law Review note discussing potential problems that might arise regarding public pensions in difficult fiscal 
times, such as altering the eligibility and benefits rules and moving investments into state securities.  See Note, 
Public Employee Pensions in Times of Fiscal Distress, 90 HARV. L. REV. 992 (1976).  In 1978, the Pension Task 
Force Report on Public Employee Retirement Systems (1978) estimated state and local unfunded pensions liabilities 
at $150 to $175 billion.  A 1979 report to Congress by the Comptroller General characterized the underfunding of 
state and local pensions as a national problem.  See U.S. GOV'T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, HRD-79-66, FUNDING OF 
STATE AND LOCAL PENSION PLANS: A NATIONAL PROBLEM (1979).  This report noted that most of the pension funds 
it analyzed were underfunded using ERISA standards.  Id. at 19.  A 1981 article in the journal Public Choice posited 
two explanations for continued growth in unfunded pension liabilities: Increased income of municipal employees 
made deferred compensation more attractive to the employees and demand for public services due to baby boomers 
going to public schools grew faster than the tax base, which made deferred compensation attractive to governments.  
See Dennis Epple & Katherine Schipper, Municipal Pension Funding: A Theory and Some Evidence, 37 PUBLIC 
CHOICE 141, 170 (1981). 
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The public pension crisis is all over the news.  Analysts refer to unfunded pension 
obligations as a ticking fiscal time bomb likely to cause serious problems in the future.
6
  
California is the state with the largest unfunded pension obligations, and recent reports predict 
that without significant, immediate reform, public services in California will face drastic cuts as 
more and more of the state’s budget is devoted to making pension payments.  Others dispute this 
and argue that pension obligations constitute a relatively small portion of state budgets and 
should be manageable over time. Which view is more accurate? 
Those claiming that there is a public pension funding crisis seriously outnumber those 
making the contrary claim that pension debt is manageable.  One study reported that unfunded 
obligations to public school teachers alone have been stated to total $332 billion, but the study’s 
own calculations put the figure at $933 billion or nearly a trillion dollars.
7
  The PEW center 
estimates are on the lower end, with a total of $1.38 trillion estimated to be underfunded for both 
pensions and retiree health care benefits, for all state and local employees.
8
  A report by the 
Little Hoover Commission, a bi-partisan state oversight agency, estimates the unfunded 
liabilities of California’s 10 largest public pension plans (of a total of 87 studied) at $240 billion, 
and predicts that large cities in California will soon be devoting one-third of their operating 
                                                 
6
 Problems with funding of public pensions are not confined to the United States.  Many nations have underfunded 
public employee pension plans.  Some are completely or partly “pay as you go” which means by design, no funds 
are set aside to pay future pension obligations—all benefits are paid out of the current budget.  See generally Eduard 
Ponds, Clara Severinson & Juan Yermo, Funding in Public Sector Pension Plans-International Evidence (Nat’l 
Bureau of Econ. Research, Working Paper No. 17082  (2011)). 
7
 See JOSH BARRO & STUART BUCK, FOUND. FOR EDUC. CHOICE OF THE MANHATTAN INST. REPORT FOR POLICY 
RESEARCH, UNDERFUNDED TEACHER PENSION PLANS: IT’S WORSE THAN YOU THINK (2010) (claiming $933 billion 
shortfall in teacher pension funding). 
8
 The Widening Gap Update, PEW CENTER ON THE STATES, June 2012, available at 
http://www.pewtrusts.org/uploadedFiles/wwwpewtrustsorg/Reports/Retirement_security/Widening%20Gap%20Brie
f%20Update_webREV.pdf.  See also Promises with a Price: Public Sector Retirement Benefits, PEW CENTER ON 
THE STATES, (2005), available at 
http://www.pewtrusts.org/uploadedFiles/wwwpewtrustsorg/Reports/State_policy/pension_report.pdf.  This is an 
excellent comprehensive report on the finances of state retirement promises. 
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budgets to pension payments.
9
  Another study concludes that to achieve full funding, government 
contributions to employee retirement, including social security and pensions, will have to 
increase by 250%, representing 14.1% of total revenues.
10
  A Mercatus Center study has 
estimated the national gap to be approximately $3 trillion,
11
 as does a 2012 report by a group 
chaired by former New York Lieutenant Governor Richard Ravitch and former Federal Reserve 
Board Chair Paul Volcker.
12
  A new study, published in July, 2012, comes to this startling 
conclusion: “the average public employee pension plan in the United States is only around 41 
percent funded while total unfunded liabilities as of 2011 are roughly $4.6 trillion.”13   Another 
analysis, by an economist at the Center for Economic Policy and Research, estimates the 
                                                 
9
  LITTLE HOOVER COMMISSION, PUBLIC PENSIONS FOR RETIREMENT SECURITY 3 (2011). 
10
 Robert Novy-Marx & Joshua D. Rauh, The Revenue Demands of Public Employee Pension Promises 1 (Simon 
School Working Paper No. FR 11-21, June 2011), available at 
http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1973668.  This conclusion depends on important assumptions 
concerning investment performance and the effect that revenue shifts and increased taxes would have on the stability 
of the tax base. 
11
 See Eileen Norcross & Andrew Biggs, The crisis in public sector pension plans: a blueprint for reform in New 
Jersey 1 (Mercatus Center, Working Paper No. 10-31, 2010).  One problem is that there is no uniform standard for 
reporting the level of pension (“Using methods that are required for private sector pensions, which value pension 
liabilities according to likelihood of payment rather than the return expected on pension assets, total liabilities 
amount to $5.2 trillion and the unfunded liability rises to $3 trillion.”).  For a proposal to create a uniform standard 
for reporting pension funding, see Daniel J. Kaspar, Defined Benefits, Undefined Costs: Moving Toward a More 
Transparent Accounting of State Public Employee Pension Plans, 3 W. & M. POL’Y REV 1 (2011), available at 
http://ssrn.com/abstract=1926234. 
12
 REPORT OF THE STATE BUDGET CRISIS TASK FORCE 2, 34-35 (2012), available at 
http://www.statebudgetcrisis.org/wpcms/wp-content/images/Report-of-the-State-Budget-Crisis-Task-Force-Full.pdf.  
This report provides a comprehensive look at state finances, including structural problems it concludes were 
exposed during the economic recession beginning in 2008.  Increased Medicaid spending and potential reductions in 
federal grants are cited as primary contributors to current state fiscal problems.  It arrives at its $3 trillion estimate of 
underfunding by using a lower discount rate than the 8 percent rate of return commonly used by pension plans to 
estimate the amount current funds will cover in future liabilities. It also estimates unfunded medical care promises as 
“likely to be well above $1 trillion.”  Id. at 43.  And the report notes that governments rarely set aside anything in 
advance to meet those promises.  Id. 
13
 ANDREW G. BIGGS, STATE BUDGET SOLUTIONS, PUBLIC SECTOR PENSIONS: HOW WELL FUNDED ARE THEY 
REALLY (2012), available at http://www.statebudgetsolutions.org/doclib/20120716_PensionFinancingUpdate.pdf.  
This study also observes that the funding problem has gotten much worse relatively recently:  “According to 
standard actuarial accounting, the average public pension has fallen to around 75 percent in 2011, versus 103 percent 
in 2000.”  Id. 
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shortfall at $647 billion, using traditional rates of return for pension fund assets.
14
  This is a 
significant shortfall, but much lower than the $3 or $4 trillion figures used by others. 
To put the magnitude of underfunding in perspective, the federal government’s total debt 
as of March, 2012, is approximately $16.5 trillion
15
 as compared to $3.8 trillion in annual 
spending, while total state and local spending per year is approximately $2.9 trillion with an 
estimated $2.6 trillion total debt.
16
  It is unclear whether this estimate of state and local debt 
includes unfunded pension liabilities.  Assuming it doesn’t, counting $3 trillion in unfunded 
pension liability and $1 trillion in unfunded retiree health care benefits promises would put the 
total state and local debt at approximately $6.5 trillion, or about 2.5 years of total spending, 
while the federal government’s debt equals more than 4 years of total federal spending.  
Websites like pensiontsunami.com (devoted to California’s pension issues) exemplify the near-
consensus that pension obligations are a ticking fiscal time bomb for state and local 
governments.
17
 
The contrary view—that there is no public pension funding crisis—is best exemplified by 
an article published on the Huffington Post titled, “An Overblown 'Crisis' For State Pension 
Funds”18 and Monique Morrissey’s study titled “Discounting Public Pensions: Reports of 
                                                 
14
 DEAN BAKER, CTR. FOR ECON. AND POLICY RESEARCH, THE ORIGINS AND SEVERITY OF THE PUBLIC PENSION 
CRISIS (2011), available at www.cepr.net/documents/publications/pensions-2011-02.pdf. 
15
 For a current estimate of the national debt of the United State, see U.S. NATIONAL DEBT CLOCK, 
http://www.brillig.com/debt_clock/. 
16
 Unless otherwise indicated, the figures in this paragraph are drawn from U.S. GOVERNMENT SPENDING, 
http://www.usgovernmentspending.com/. 
17
 Another example of an analysis claiming that there is a crisis is a 2010 report by Taxpayers for Wilson. HARRY J. 
WILSON, PUBLIC PENSIONS: AVERTING NEW YORK’S LOOMING TAX CATASTROPHE,(2010), available at 
http://wilsonfornewyork.com/white_papers.  This report was issued by the campaign of a candidate, Harry Wilson, 
for New York State Comptroller.  Wilson lost the election. 
18
 Zach Carter, An Overblown “Crisis” For State Pension Funds, HUFFINGTON POST, Mar. 7, 2011, available at 
http://www.huffingtonpost.com/2011/03/07/state-pension-plans_n_829112.html. 
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Trillions in Shortfalls Ignore Expected Returns on Assets.”19  These articles claim that state and 
local pension obligations are manageable, and that the contrary view is based on conservative 
analysts using low projected rates of return on pension fund assets to make the funding gap look 
larger than it actually is.  Morrissey’s study claims that to meet the actual shortfalls, state and 
local governments would have to increase their pension funding from 4 percent of their budgets 
to 5 percent, a significant but manageable increase.  While many studies attack state and local 
pension funds for justifying low current contributions by predicting an 8 percent return on 
investments, Morrissey claims that 8 percent is historically accurate and more realistic than the 
much lower Treasury Bill rate used by those claiming that a crisis exists. 
A particularly comprehensive study claiming that unfunded pension liabilities do not 
present a severe problem was published in 2007 by the Government Accountability Office, the 
research arm of Congress.
20
  That study found that “the additional contributions that state and 
local governments will need to make in future years to fully fund their pensions on an ongoing 
basis are only slightly higher than the current contribution rate.”21 Specifically, the study found 
that “contribution rates would need to rise to 9.3 percent of salaries, less than a half percent more 
than the 9.0 percent contribution rate in 2006.”22  The GAO report was much more concerned 
with health care costs because many governments do not set aside anything to fund health care 
                                                 
19
 MONIQUE MORRISSEY, ECON. POLICY INST., DISCOUNTING PUBLIC PENSIONS: REPORTS OF TRILLIONS IN 
SHORTFALLS IGNORE EXPECTED RETURNS ON ASSETS (2011). 
20
 U.S. GOV'T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, GAO-07-1156,STATE AND LOCAL GOVERNMENT RETIREE BENEFITS: 
CURRENT STATUS OF BENEFIT STRUCTURES, PROTECTIONS, AND FISCAL OUTLOOK FOR FUNDING FUTURE COSTS 
(2007). 
21
 Id. at 27. 
22
 Id.  This study was conducted before the financial crisis and recession that began in 2008, so it is unclear if these 
calculations are still accurate.  A slightly more recent study of funding status of state and local government retiree 
benefits is U.S. GOV'T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, GAO-08-223, STATE AND LOCAL GOVERNMENT RETIREE 
BENEFITS: CURRENT FUNDED STATUS OF PENSION AND HEALTH BENEFITS (2008). 
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promises, and if health care costs continue to rise, it may be difficult for the promises to be 
fulfilled.
23
 
The Huffington Post article reveals the political nature of this dispute.  The article 
characterizes the Economic Policy Institute, which concludes that there is no serious problem, as 
“partly funded by unions,” and attacks the Mercatus study as unreliable at least partly because 
the Mercatus Center is funded by the Koch brothers, well-known conservative activists.  
Morrissey points out that the same conservatives who use the low Treasury bill rate as the 
expected return on pension fund assets touted privatization of Social Security accounts on the 
basis of much higher returns in the stock market. 
My sense is that while there may be some exaggeration out there, the pension funding 
crisis is real.  In a detailed review of public pension financing, Jonathan Forman makes a 
convincing case that there is a funding problem.
24
  As Forman explains,  
[b]ecause governments tolerate an 80% funding level and use actuarial valuations instead 
of market valuations, public pensions are almost guaranteed to be underfunded. Public 
sector workers tend to get larger pensions as a result, but much of the cost of those larger 
pensions is pushed onto future generations of taxpayers.
25
   
                                                 
23
 Another report concludes that while in 2010, 3.8 percent of state and local budgets were devoted to paying 
pension costs, that figure would rise to somewhere between 5 and 12.5 percent, depending on the health of the plan 
and investment outcomes.  See ALICIA H. MUNNELL, JEAN-PIERRE AUBRY & LAURA QUINBY, CTR. FOR RET. 
RESEARCH, THE IMPACT OF PUBLIC PENSIONS ON STATE AND LOCAL BUDGETS (2010).  Some states would have 
more serious problems however.  For example, the authors predict that Illinois, a state with severe underfunding of 
pension plans, may have to devote approximately 17 percent of its state budget to meet all of its pension obligations.  
See id. at 6, fig. 9. 
24
 Jonathan B. Forman, Funding Public Pension Plans, 42 J. MARSHALL L. REV. 837 (2009). 
25
 Id. at 860.  Forman explains that “bad things happen” when pension funds are fully funded because employees 
often successfully lobby for increased pension benefits and legislatures reduce payments or take funding “holidays” 
to use the money for other purposes.  Surprisingly, Forman nevertheless calls for full current funding but proposes a 
more radical restructuring for future government employees that would either eliminate the traditional method of 
calculating pension payments based on the highest salary or replace benefit plans with contribution plans. 
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The 2012 analysis by a group led by Paul Volker, with distinguished members such as Alice 
Rivlin, Nicolas Brady, and George Shultz, concludes that unfunded pension and retiree health 
care liabilities are significant and absent serious reform, will contribute to future fiscal 
problems.
26
  The amount of time and energy being devoted to raising alarms about the fiscal 
consequences of promises to retirees by responsible groups seems out of proportion if the 
purpose is to mount an indirect attack on public employee unions and public collective 
bargaining.  While some politicians may have used this pension issue as a basis for attacking 
public employee unions, there seems to be genuine concern over future pension funding from a 
diverse array of observers, including the New York Times which does not generally carry the 
flag for conservative causes. 
The situation with health care promises to retirees may be even worse than the pension 
problem because fewer state and local government entities have set aside any funds to pay for 
those expenses.  Coupled with serious inflation in the cost of health care and health insurance, 
the failure to set aside funds to pay for this may prove disastrous as more workers retire. 
B. Are Public Pension Promises Excessive or Abusive? 
While the point is subject to dispute, let’s assume that unfunded promises to current and 
future retirees constitute a significant fiscal problem for state and local governments.  The next 
set of questions involves whether excessive promises of retirement benefits have been made to 
public employees and whether public pension plans are subject to abuse.  
                                                 
26
 REPORT OF THE STATE BUDGET CRISIS TASK FORCE, supra note x.  For an analysis of the likely consequences to 
retiree health care benefits, see Richard Kaplan, Nicholas Powers & Jordan Zucker, Retirees at Risk: The Precarious 
Promise of Post-Employment Health Benefits, 9 YALE J. HEALTH POL'Y L. & ETHICS 287 (2009). 
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The defense of defined benefit public pensions often begins by pointing out that the 
average government employee pension is less than $20,000 per year, which certainly does not 
sound excessive.  It is not clear, however, whether this is a meaningful figure.  There are many 
government pension recipients who worked for the government just long enough to qualify, and 
who thus receive very small pensions.  What really needs to be examined is the pension available 
to the government employee who makes a career in government service, how that fits into the 
overall compensation package for government employees, and how public retirement benefits 
compare to the retirement benefits available to private sector employees.   
One possibility that should be dismissed is to make a direct comparison between public 
sector pensions and federal Social Security retirement benefits.  One could imagine comparing 
contributions and benefits and ask whether public pension recipients are receiving overly 
generous benefits.  There are two sets of reasons why this comparison is not apt.  First, Social 
Security taxes pay for aspects of the program that go far beyond retirement benefits.  In addition 
to retirement benefits, FICA pays for disability benefits, survivor benefits for spouses and 
children, a small death benefit, and potential benefits for multiple former spouses.  Further, 
Social Security is fully portable between jobs.  Second, public sector pensions are part of the 
state and local employees’ compensation packages from their employer.  In principle, the 
magnitude of their contributions to the fund is irrelevant to whether the pension promises are 
overly generous.  When a person decides whether to accept government employment, and to 
remain in government employment when other opportunities arise, pensions and other post-
employment benefits are undoubtedly part of the calculus.  Current salary may be lower for 
government employees in the public sector than for workers in the private sector, and the public 
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sector may offer fewer opportunities for advancement, especially for those without political 
connections.  Greater job security, pensions and retiree health care promises may balance these 
factors out, so that overall the promises to retirees are not out of line.  As a form of deferred 
compensation, public sector pensions may be perfectly reasonable.  
Thus, even if it is true, as one study claims, that public pensions can be 4.5 times higher 
than social security benefits based on the same work history, this may not establish anything 
about the fairness of public pensions.
27
  This possibility should also be tempered by the fact that 
social security recipients contribute less than many public pension recipients.  Before recent 
stimulus measures, the combined employer-employee contribution to social security was 12.4% 
of the first $110,00 of income, while the combined contribution to public pensions in some 
jurisdictions may be closer to 20% or even more.
28
  There may be states and localities in which 
employees are required to contribute much less, with the expectation that the government will 
fund retirement benefits, but again, the real question is whether the pension is reasonable as an 
element of compensation, not as a direct comparison with Social Security benefits.
29
 
                                                 
27
 It may also be the case the Social Security is underpaying based on contributions.  For an argument that Social 
Security is a bad deal for current workers, see Jagadeesh Gokhale & Laurence J. Kotlikoff, Social Security’s 
Treatment of Postwar Americans: How Bad Can It Get?, in The Distributional Effects of Social Security Reform, 
(Martin Feldstein, ed.), University of Chicago Press (2002). 
28
 See Social Security Benefits vs. Public Pensions, CIV FI (May 8, 2010), http://civfi.com/2010/05/08/social-
security-vs-public-pensions/.  One report states that in Missouri, combined teacher and employer contributions have 
risen to 29% of salary in an attempt to accumulate sufficient equity to support promised pensions.  See Robert 
Costrell, Michael Podgursky,and Christian Weller, "Fixing Teacher Pensions," Education Next, Fall 2011, pp. 60-
69.  http://educationnext.org/files/ednext_20114_forum.pdf.  The authors advocate tying pension payments strictly 
to contributions and actual investment performance. 
29
 It may be more useful to compare the replacement rate of public pensions with the replacement rate of private 
pensions.  The replacement rate is the percentage of salary replaced by the pension.  In 1985, a study calculated that 
the average worker retiring in 1984 at a $40,000 salary with 40 years of service received a pension replacing 32.3% 
of salary.  See Donald Schmitt, Today’s Pension Plans: How Much Do The Pay?, Monthly Labor Review December 
1985 22, Table 5.  These retirees would also receive Social Security benefits which would replace another portion of 
their salaries.  Still, this is likely to be a lower replacement rate than what many public sector employees receive 
today. 
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This picture is complicated by disagreement over whether public sectors workers truly 
earn less in current and overall compensation than their private sector counterparts.  In some 
circles, it is now widely thought that public sector workers earn greater total salary and benefits 
than comparable private sector workers.  For example, the Bureau of Labor Statistics found that 
in December 2010, private sector workers earned approximately $28 per hour in total 
compensation, while their public sector counterparts at the state and local level earned 
approximately $40.
30
 
Politicians have noticed this purported fact: Indiana Governor Mitch Daniels has 
described public sector workers as “a new privileged class in America,”31 while former 
Minnesota Governor Tim Pawlenty stated: “It used to be that public employees were underpaid 
and over-benefited. Now they are over-benefited and overpaid compared to their private-sector 
counterparts.”32  It is unclear, however, whether this is due to gains by public employees or 
losses in the private sector, where defined benefit pension plans have virtually disappeared along 
with many high paying jobs. 
As should be expected, it is also not clear whether the apparent compensation disparity 
between public and private sector employees is real.  Views on this seem to fall out along similar 
political fault lines as whether the funding crisis is real or imagined.  Some studies dispute the 
disparity theory by claiming that higher pay for government workers is attributable to age, 
                                                 
30
 BUREAU OF LABOR STATISTICS, EMPLOYER COSTS FOR EMPLOYEE COMPENSATION – DECEMBER 2010 1 (2011), 
available at http://www.bls.gov/news.release/archives/ecec_03092011.pdf.   
31
 Ben Smith & Maggie Haberman, Pols Turn on Labor Unions, POLITICO, June 6, 2010, available at 
http://www.politico.com/news/stories/0610/38183.html. 
32
 Joe Kimball, Gov. Pawlenty: Public Employees Are “Over-Benefited and Overpaid”, MINNNPOST.COM, Apr. 30, 
2010, available at 
http://www.minnpost.com/politicalagenda/2010/04/30/17788/gov_pawlenty_public_employees_are_over-
benefited_and_overpaid. 
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education, and skill level required for the jobs.
33
  When one accounts for these and similar traits, 
it is argued that public sector workers are undercompensated relative to their private sector 
counterparts.
34
  One 2010 study, by the Center for Economic and Policy Research, found a 4% 
wage “penalty” for public sector workers, taking into account wages and benefits, and 
controlling for age and education.
35
 
There is no question that public employees as a group receive vastly higher defined 
benefit pension compensation than private employees, since most private employers have halted 
the practice.  Many public employees, about one in four, are not in the Social Security system, 
which means that their state pension is their only source of employer and government support in 
old age.  It would be grossly unfair to state employees if pension reform did not take into account 
the fact that they don’t participate in the federal Social Security system.  Comparing the raw 
numbers between private and public employee pension payments should take Social Security 
into account, especially since participating employers and employees both contribute to Social 
Security. 
                                                 
33
 See Jeffrey Keefe, Debunking the Myth of the Overcompensated Public Employee: The Evidence 3 (Econ. Policy 
Inst., Briefing Paper No. 276, 2010) (“Prior research revels that education level is the single most important earnings 
predictor.”); JOHN SCHMITT, CTR. FOR ECON. AND POLICY RES., THE WAGE PENALTY FOR STATE AND LOCAL 
GOVERNMENT EMPLOYEES 3 (2010); SYLVIA A. ALLEGRETTO & JEFFREY KEEFE, BERKELEY CTR. ON WAGES AND 
EMP’T DYNAMICS, THE TRUTH ABOUT PUBLIC EMPLOYEES IN CALIFORNIA: THEY ARE NEITHER OVERPAID NOR 
OVERCOMPENSATED 3 (2010) (“a re-estimated regression equation of total compensation (which includes wages and 
benefits) demonstrates that there is no significant difference in total compensation between full-time state and local 
employees and private-sector employees”) (emphasis omitted); KEITH A. BENDER & JOHN S. HEYWOOD, NAT’L 
INST. ON RET. SEC., OUT OF BALANCE? COMPARING PUBLIC AND PRIVATE SECTOR COMPENSATION OVER 20 YEARS 
(2010) (concluding that on average state and local employees are underpaid when compared to private-sector 
workers by approximately 7 percent); Michael A. Miller, The Public-Private Pay Debate: What Do the Data Show? 
119 MONTHLY LAB. REV. 19 (1996) (finding mixed results with lower level state and local workers earning more 
than their private counterparts but higher level workers earning more in the private sector than the public sector). 
34
 Keefe, supra note x. 
35
 Keefe, supra note x.  Keefe’s analysis has been attacked in, among others, CTR. FOR UNION FACTS, THE 
ECONOMIC POLICY INSTITUTE IS WRONG: PUBLIC EMPLOYEES ARE OVERPAID (no date), available at 
http://www.unionfacts.com/downloads/Public_Sector_UnionsBrief.pdf. 
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One author reports that in Wisconsin, which he characterizes as the eighth most generous 
state in terms of income replacement, the average retired worker receives a pension equal to 57% 
of their pre-retirement salary.
 36
  The full pension is paid after 35 years at age 57 for non-public 
safety employees.  More comprehensively, a 1997 table reports average replacement rates for 
public employees without Social Security of about 62%,
37
 but this may be lower than the 
replacement rate for current retirees, if reports that governments have sweetened pensions in 
recent years are true.  This rate is more generous for most private employees receiving pensions 
but not to such a great extent when Social Security payments are included in the comparison. 
As in many situations, the view that public employee pensions are excessive is supported 
by notorious instances of what is known as pension “spiking,” in which employees take 
advantage of provisions in pension plans that allow them to increase their pension benefits, often 
as they prepare to retire.  Public employee pensions are usually based on the employee’s pay at 
the end of the career, often the average of the employee’s last three or five years of government 
employment.  Employees make efforts to increase their pay at the end of their careers to “spike” 
their pensions.  Even if the methods employees use to spike their pensions are within the rules of 
the pension system, they seem illegitimate for the simple reason that pensions manipulated in 
this manner are not related to the employee’s needs and legitimate expectations after retirement.   
Here are a few examples of pension spiking.  One way that pensions can be spiked is to 
add additional part-time work during the years when salary is used to calculate pension benefits.  
                                                 
36
 See Paul M. Secunda, Constitutional Contracts Clause Challenges in Public Pension Litigation, 28 Hofstra Lab. & 
Emp. L.J. 263, 273-74(2011). 
37
 See Ann C. Foster, Public and Private Sector Defined Benefit Pensions: A Comparison, Compensation & 
Working Conditions, Summer 1997, at 41, available at http://www.bls.gov/opub/cwc/archive/summer1997art5.pdf 
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For example, in some jurisdictions, public high school teachers can teach evening courses at a 
community college and then count that pay in total salary for pension purposes.  This apparently 
common practice among teachers in some areas can boost pension benefits significantly.  In 
Massachusetts (and perhaps in other states) longevity clauses are included in public employees’ 
collective bargaining agreements.  The employee informs the employer either one or three years 
in advance that they plan to retire and under the agreement, their salary is boosted in recognition 
of their longevity.  This also boosts their pension, which is the design of the contract.  If the 
employee changes her mind and decides not to retire, she can simply pay the bonus back to the 
governmental unit.  The amount and length of the bonus (usually either one or three years) is 
determined in unionized sectors in collective bargaining between the employee union and the 
governmental unit. 
Another legally sanctioned form of pension spiking involves pension “buybacks” for 
various forms of service outside the pension system.  Under a buyback program, an employee is 
allowed to pay a year’s contribution to the system to purchase a year of service credit toward a 
state pension.  Employee contributions are not sufficient to cover the increased costs to the 
pension system, so these buybacks are a good deal for the employee but not for taxpayers who 
will be required to make up the shortfall sometime in the future.  For example, in 2008, 
Massachusetts enacted a provision allowing public school teachers to buy pension credit for 
years in the Peace Corps.  Several other bills were proposed in the following year to expand buy 
back, in the midst of efforts to eliminate abuses such as counting volunteer service on 
government boards toward pension service; one day to one year of service provisions (which 
were used by outgoing legislators to receive an entire year of service credit for the first week of 
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January when their terms expired); and king for a day provisions, which allowed employees to be 
promoted for one day and then retire at a higher rate.
38
  For example, school nurses sought to be 
allowed to buy pension credit for years in nursing before they entered a school system, and 
higher education teachers sought to be included in the Peace Corps buyback provision.   
One of the most striking examples of legislative largesse in the pension area happened in 
Rhode Island in the 1980s.  Rhode Island public school teachers had been covered by state 
pensions since 1936.  As is generally true of public school teachers in the United States, Rhode 
Island public school teachers are highly unionized.  In the 1980s, they lobbied for inclusion of 
their union’s employees in the state pension plan despite the fact that they are not government 
employees.  In 1987, the Rhode Island General Assembly obliged, and union employees were 
allowed join the teachers’ pension plan, conditional on payments to buy years of creditable 
service.  As a court later detailed: 
Inclusion in the state pension system was a great deal for the union employees.   
Bernard Singleton, for example, became a member of the Retirement System effective 
January 1, 1990  . . . and promptly purchased roughly 25 years of service credit for his 
prior union employment at a cost of $25,411.09.  On July 28, 1990, several months later, 
at age 52, he took “early retirement” and immediately began to collect a pension of 
approximately $53,000 per year, with an expected lifetime benefit of about $750,000.
39
 
 
 The return on investment for these participants was beyond even Bernard Madoff’s wildest 
dreams.  “The district court later calculated the plaintiffs' total contribution to the Retirement 
                                                 
38
 A bill eliminating some of these abusive practices was passed and signed in 2009.  See Act Providing Responsible 
Reforms in the Pension System, ch. 21, 2009 Mass. Laws (June 16, 2009).  This law eliminated pension credit for 
volunteer service, the one day rule, under which one day of work counted for pension purposes as a full year of 
service, and it outlawed the practice of combining work from multiple government jobs to receive a higher pension.  
See Michael Levenson, Key Measures Passed in Mass., BOSTON GLOBE, Aug. 17, 2010, at 1. 
39
 Nat'l Educ. Ass'n-Rhode Island ex rel. Scigulinsky v. Ret. Bd. of Rhode Island Employees' Ret. Sys.,, 
172 F.3d 22, 24 (1
st
 Cir. 1999). 
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System at $1,995,784, the present value of their projected pension benefits at about $11,430,579, 
and an average projected rate of return for the individual plaintiffs of approximately 1250 
percent.”40  Once the details of this plan became generally known, the Rhode Island General 
Assembly repealed it and provided that no further benefits would be paid.
41
  The United States 
Court of Appeals for the First Circuit upheld this repeal against attacks based on federal 
constitutional rights to continued benefits.
42
 
There are notorious individual instances of pension spiking under which employees have 
boosted their pensions in ways that seem illegitimate.  The most famous example in 
Massachusetts is William Bulger, who retired after 35 years in Massachusetts government, 
including 17 years as President of the State Senate, and 7 years as President of the University of 
Massachusetts.  His retirement salary was approximately $300,000, entitling him to a lifetime 
pension of $179,000.  In the last few years of his service as University President, the Board of 
Trustees added a housing allowance to his compensation, even though Bulger was living at his 
longtime home which he owned.  When Bulger retired (under pressure over his relationship with 
his then-fugitive brother Whitey Bulger), he included the housing allowance as part of his salary 
for pension purposes, and the Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court agreed, boosting the 
pension to $196,000 annually.
43
 
Another Massachusetts example of pension spiking which provoked the above-mentioned 
reform efforts involved a public school teacher who added almost $3000 per year to her $26,000 
                                                 
40
 Id. at 24-25. 
41
 Id. Participants were given a refund of their contributions in excess of the amount they had already received in 
benefits. 
42
 Id.  
43
 Bulger v. Contributory Ret. Appeal Bd., 447 Mass. 651 (2006) 
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pension by including years of volunteer service on the board of her city’s public library.44  The 
fact that she counted two years during which she failed to attend a single library board meeting 
made her case look even weaker than it would have had she been a dedicated volunteer board 
member.  One State Representative
45
 who spoke out in favor of closing this method of pension 
spiking, later included unpaid service on a local school board as part of his pension-eligible 
service, provoking cries of hypocrisy in a newspaper editorial.  Finally, also in Massachusetts, is 
the example of an employee working two full-time government jobs and claiming two separate 
full pensions.
46
  Even if pensions to public officials are generally not abusive, examples of 
abusive practices like those discussed above taint the entire system. 
C. Why? 
Assuming that there is a funding crisis and that public sector employees have been 
promised excessive or at least potentially abusive retirement benefits, including pensions and 
                                                 
44
 See Sean P. Murphy, Ex-lawmaker's wife got pension boost: Credit given for Lynn library job, BOSTON GLOBE, 
April, 19 2009.  The article also reports that the teacher’s ex-legislator husband also benefitted from generous 
pension provisions apparently designed just for him by the Massachusetts legislative leadership.  “The carefully 
tailored provision, which did not mention Bassett by name, permitted him to collect his $41,000-a-year state pension 
even while working full time as the Essex Regional Retirement Board chairman and executive director, a job that 
currently pays him an estimated $123,000 a year.”  Ex-representative Bassett was fined $10,000 for engaging in 
private lobbying activity on government time using government facilities.  See Paul Leighton, Bassett fined $10,000, 
SALEM NEWS (Oct. 21, 2011), http://www.salemnews.com/local/x2117288138/Bassett-fined-10-000/print.  He had 
been fired the prior year year for deficient performance “after years of controversy over his high salary, lavish 
expense accounts, and exorbitant legal and consultant fees.”  Id.  The pensions of both Bassetts apparently were 
boosted by legislative action crafted exclusively for them at both the city and state levels. 
45
 See Edward Mason, Pol OK’d pension reform, but then tried to cash in, BOSTON HERALD (Sep. 30, 2009), 
http://bostonherald.com/news/politics/view/20090930pol_okd_pension_reform_but_then_tried_to_cash_in.  This 
particular state representative had been in the news for an “arrest in 2004 for drunken driving, gross lewdness and 
disorderly conduct, and his $17,000 fine in 2007 and $10,000 in 2004 for violating Massachusetts campaign finance 
law.” Id. 
46
 See Matt Carroll, Ex-officer is cleared on fraud charges, BOSTON GLOBE, June 15, 2007, at 6 (“Lincoln was 
collecting a $139,787 pension, based on his average pay for the last three years of his working career; it was the 
highest in Plymouth County history.  . . . Sullivan, in his report, said the taxpayers of Plymouth County should find 
‘the Lincoln pension situation to be incredibly offensive,’ noting that Lincoln worked only three years for the county 
but will be paid about $60,000 a year by [county] taxpayers for the rest of his life.”) 
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health care, the final question for this part of the discussion is why did this happen.  Why would 
politicians make such promises and underfund them? 
To a certain extent, the pathology is typical of deficit spending by government.
47
  
Incumbents can gain political support by enacting programs favored by constituents without 
requiring taxpayers to currently pay the full cost of the programs.  Taxes can remain low even as 
services expand.  Taxpayers are happy to enjoy the value of current services and reelect 
politicians that provide them. 
Deficit spending is not unambiguously bad.  During poor economic times, its use as 
economic stimulus may help cushion the effects of recession and even spur economic growth.  
Too often, however, deficit spending seems to be intended more for political stimulus than 
economic stimulus.  After record surpluses at the end of the Clinton administration, tax cuts and 
increased spending under George W. Bush put the federal budget in deficit, which has continued 
and been amplified during the Obama administration.  Although the argument in favor of tax cuts 
is that they increase economic activity which leads to more tax revenue, it appears that tax 
increases during the Clinton years contributed to surpluses then, and tax cuts at the outset of the 
administration of George W. Bush contributed to deficits in every budget he signed.  Deficit 
spending appears to be a powerful political stimulus. 
Unfunded pension promises benefit politicians in two ways.  First, as in all deficit 
spending, they allow for current officials to provide services without requiring taxpayers to pay 
                                                 
47
 See Darryl B. Simko, Of Public Pensions, State Constitutional Contract Protection, and Fiscal Constraint, 69 
TEMPLE L. REV. 1059, 1061 (1996) (characterizing underfunded pensions as a form of deficit spending). 
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for them until much later, when they may be out of office.
48
  Second, pension promises help 
politicians shore up support among government workers,
49
 or at least avoid opposition from 
government workers which would be substantial if significant reductions in pension benefits 
were proposed. 
Taxpayers go along with underfunding for several simple reasons.  First, each taxpayer’s 
share of the overall liability is likely to be relatively small, or at least appear to be small at the 
time the promises are made.  The psychological tendency to discount long-term problems likely 
reinforces the impression of each taxpayer that the unfunded liability is not a problem for them.  
Second, information on the extent of unfunded liabilities is not readily available, and what 
information there is may be difficult to interpret.  Taxpayers may simply not know that public 
employees have been promised overly generous pensions or that tax revenues are insufficient to 
fund them.  This problem is aggravated by the use of overly optimistic projected rates of return 
on pension fund investments which help obfuscate the financial status of the funds.  Third, some 
taxpayers may conclude that they are unlikely to be affected by the whole mess at the time the 
obligations come due.   Taxpayers move, retire, and die, all of which would minimize or exclude 
them from the negative effects future taxpayers may suffer due to unfunded pension liabilities.
50
   
Excessive or abusive pension promises also occur due to the nature of the relationship 
between government employees and elected officials, and policymakers’ self-interest.  
                                                 
48
 Joshua Rauh, The Pension Bomb, MILKEN INST. REV. 26, 28 (First Quarter 2011) cited in David A. Skeel, Jr., 
States of Bankruptcy, 79 U. CHI. L. REV. 677, 692 (2012). 
49
 Skeel, supra note x, at 691. 
50
 Robert P. Inman, “Municipal Pension Funding: A Theory and Some Evidence”  by Dennis Epple and Katherine 
Schipper: A Comment, 37 PUB. CHOICE 179, 180 (1981).  See also Robert P. Inman, Public Employee Pensions and 
the Local Labor Budget, 19 J. PUB. ECON. 49, 50 (1982) (arguing that mobile taxpayers are likely to support 
deferring payment for current services until later at the expense of poorer, less mobile, residents). 
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Government employees are often among the most ardent supporters of incumbent politicians 
because such employees depend on politicians for their jobs, levels of pay, and working 
conditions.
51
  In the age of patronage, the relationship between employees and elected officials 
was quite direct because virtually all government workers owed their jobs to some sort of 
connection to an elected official.  But even in this era in which civil service is the dominant 
government employment system, patronage still exists at high levels and various pockets of 
government.
52
  Further, even if only a small percentage of employees are in a close relationship 
with elected officials, whatever system of pay and benefits is created will normally be designed 
to cover everyone.  In other words, the desire to be generous to “connected” employees 
contributes to excessive compensation for all employees.  Finally, in some situations, officials 
have the power to shape policies governing their own pensions, which can also result in generous 
promises that include themselves and other public employees. 
In the pension area, the effects of close relationships between politicians and employees 
can be quite direct.  For example, in the case discussed above involving the employee in 
Plymouth County, Massachusetts, who worked two full time jobs and claimed two separate 
pensions, one of his employers, an elected County Sheriff, sat on the retirement board that 
                                                 
51
 See Skeel, supra note x. 
52
 In Massachusetts, a scandal over patronage hiring at the state probation department has led to federal indictments 
of several officials including the former head of the department.  It has been reported that federal prosecutors are 
investigating whether state legislators who “recommended” candidates to probation department jobs violated federal 
law in the process.  Andreas Estes & Thomas Farragher, Ex-probation chief, 2 aides indicted in hiring scandal: 
Accused of rigging selection process for job applicants, BOSTON GLOBE, March 24, 2012, at 1; Andrea Estes & 
Scott Allen, DiMasi facing a cancer diagnosis Ex-speaker's illness likely to be treated at prison medical center, 
BOSTON GLOBE, May 19, 2012, at 1 (suggesting that the investigation includes looking into whether state legislators 
violated federal law). 
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approved one of the pensions.  The employee had helped the Sheriff’s election campaign.53  
There are thousands of similar relationships throughout state and local government that 
undoubtedly influence compensation decisions.
54
  In short, before the recent spotlight that has 
shined on the pension issue, from one perspective, the entire system may have operated like an 
enormous conspiracy to capture as much of the taxpayers’ money for retired workers as possible. 
We now have two general ways of understanding why government employees might be 
overcompensated and why an important part of that compensation takes the form of unfunded 
pension obligations.  There are also particulars concerning how unfunded pension promises 
developed that can illuminate this problem.  Political scientists and economists began looking at 
this issue as long ago as the 1970s.  One early view was that as government employment became 
more professionalized and wages increased, deferred compensation in the form of pensions 
became very attractive at the same time that taxpayers demanded increased services without 
really wanting to pay for them.
55
  It also appears that at certain times, public employee unions 
                                                 
53
 “The pension system is the way it is because those who oversee it, the cops and firefighters who run the retirement 
boards, have it just the way they like it. As the inspector general notes, Lincoln was no accident. Former Plymouth 
County Sheriff Joseph McDonough, who hired Lincoln for this three-year victory lap at the jail, knew how the 
system worked. He is on the Plymouth County retirement board. Lincoln, not coincidentally, helped on 
McDonough's campaign in 2000.” Steve Bailey, Putting a Face on the Need to Reform, BOSTON GLOBE, June 7, 
2006, at D1. 
54
 Another good illustration is the ability of the state teachers’ union in Rhode Island to convince the legislature to 
allow employees of the union to buy into the state pension system, resulting in a 1250 percent return on investment.  
See infra note x. 
55
 Dennis Epple & Katherine Schipper, Municipal Pension Funding: A Theory and Some Evidence, 37 PUB. CHOICE 
141, 170 (1981).  Interestingly, Epple and Schipper suggest that public pension underfunding should decrease as the 
school-aged population of baby boomers declines. 
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placed a higher priority on current wages than on adequate funding of pension promises, even if 
this created some risk of nonpayment in the future.
56
 
Two additional historical factors have contributed to the problem of pension funding.  
One factor is that in good economic times, governments have tended to increase all forms of 
employee compensation, including pension promises.
57
  Assuming a general level of 
underfunding, a higher overall payroll is likely to produce a higher level of underfunding.  
Another factor is that in tight fiscal times, governments have foregone or reduced pension 
contributions and used the money to fund other services.
58
  This is not surprising since 
constituents’ demand for services may actually increase in periods when funds are tight due to 
economic downturn.  State balanced budget requirements may contribute to this aspect of the 
problem: Because borrowing to meet operating expenses may not be available, underfunding 
pension obligations because a necessary tool to balance the budget without making drastic cuts to 
services.
59
  These two dynamics, increased promises in boom times coupled with decreased 
funding in tough times, is a recipe for fiscal disaster. 
In sum, unfunded pension and health care promises to retirees are, in a sense, the state 
and local version of the federal deficit.  Politicians have twin incentives at work: To defer 
payment for current services to future generations of taxpayers, and to reward loyal supporters in 
the ranks of government workers with handsome compensation packages including generous 
                                                 
56
 Olivia S. Mitchell & Robert S. Smith, Pension Funding in the Public Sector, 76 REV. ECON. & STAT. 278, 282-83 
(1994).   Public employee unions have challenged underfunding as violating their contractual or constitutional 
rights, apparently out of concern that if the system is underfunded, their pensions might not be paid in full. 
57
 See REPORT OF THE STATE BUDGET CRISIS TASK FORCE, supra note x, at 40-41. 
58
 See Barbara A. Chaney, Paul A. Copley & Mary S. Stone, The Effect of Fiscal Stress and Balanced Budget 
Requirements on the Funding and Measurement of State Pension Obligations, 21 J. ACCOUNTING & PUB. POL’Y 
287, 293 (2002). 
59
 See generally Chaney et al., supra note x. 
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retirement benefits.  Even if most government workers are of little concern to politicians, the 
desire to reward the connected few (and often themselves) contributes to the phenomenon of all 
boats rising together. Even legislators themselves may need to establish an attractive pension 
system for all government workers to justify their own generous post-service compensation.  
Taxpayers may now be waking up, but as we shall see in the discussion of legal constraints on 
pension reform, it may be too late to avoid severe fiscal hardship. 
II. State Law Constraints on Underfunding Pension Liabilities and Pension Reform. 
Recent and continuing fiscal difficulties in many state and local government entities have 
inspired searches for ways to save money.  Pensions are an obvious candidate, but even if state 
legislatures were determined to reduce pension promises, state contract law and state 
constitutional law designed to protect the legitimate expectations of state and local employees 
may stand in the way.  In this part of the article, I look at three state law issues concerning 
pension reform: the effects of state balanced budget requirements on pension funding, state law 
constraints on underfunding pension contributions; and state contract and constitutional law 
constraints on reducing pension benefits or promises to workers not yet retired.  As we shall see, 
state law can pose significant impediments to pension reform. 
A. State Balanced Budget Requirements and Pension Plan Funding  
In debates over fiscal policy, the fact that balanced budget requirements exist in nearly 
every state
60
 is held up as evidence that the federal government could and should follow suit and 
                                                 
60
 State balanced budget requirements arise from constitutional provisions, statutory provisions and in a few cases 
from court decisions interpreting financial provisions of state constitutions.  See NAT’L CONFERENCE OF STATE 
LEGISLATURES, NCSL FISCAL BRIEF: STATE BALANCED BUDGET PROVISIONS 8 (2010), available at 
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balance its budget.  This has been a cornerstone of the Tea Party movement, and during 2011’s 
controversy over extending the federal government’s debt limits, there was a proposal to 
condition the extension on Congress voting for a balanced budget amendment to the federal 
Constitution.  As we have seen, however, the magnitude of unfunded state pension and health 
care promises shows that states are not nearly as constrained as might appear from the existence 
of balanced budget requirements.  This raises questions of whether the failure to fund pension 
obligations constitutes unlawful deficit spending, and whether such a violation would justify 
renunciation of some portion of unfunded obligations. 
The simple answer is that state failure to fund pension liabilities is not considered a 
violation of state balanced budget requirements.  Further, in some states, competing 
constitutional requirements prohibiting diminution of pension promises mean that the weight of 
state constitutional law is more strongly on the side of what is, in effect, deficit spending, than it 
is on the side of fiscal constraint. 
The first thing to understand about state balanced budget requirements is that they are 
quite diverse and impose varying levels of fiscal discipline.  One important fact is that state 
balanced budget requirements normally affect only state operating budgets, not capital or long-
term debt obligations.
61
   This means that states are free to finance capital projects with long-
                                                                                                                                                             
http://www.ncsl.org/documents/fiscal/StateBalancedBudgetProvisions2010.pdf (citing NAT’L ASS’N OF STATE 
BUDGET OFFICERS, BUDGET PROCESSES IN THE STATES 40 (2008)).  For a general look at the effect of balanced 
budget requirements, see Yilin Hou & Daniel L. Smith, Do State Balanced Budget Requirements Matter? Testing 
Two Explanatory Frameworks, 145 PUBLIC CHOICE 57 (2009).  This study concludes that balanced budget 
requirements have effects on the government and that the evidence is inconclusive on whether there is a difference 
in effects between constitutional and statutory balanced budget requirements.  See also James M. Poterba, Balanced 
Budget Rules and Fiscal Policy: Evidence from the States, 48 NAT’L TAX J. 329 (1995). 
61
 NAT’L CONFERENCE OF STATE LEGISLATURES, NCSL FISCAL BRIEF: STATE BALANCED BUDGET PROVISIONS 7 
(2010), available at http://www.ncsl.org/documents/fiscal/StateBalancedBudgetProvisions2010.pdf. For a general 
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term debt, which is sensible fiscal policy because current taxpayers might be unwilling to fully 
finance projects with long-term benefits.  Interest payments on long-term debt would presumably 
be included in the operating budget which must be balanced each year, but there is no prohibition 
on incurring long term debt.  However, state constitutions often contain stringent limits on the 
use of debt financing.  Thus, the exclusion of long-term debt from balanced budget requirements 
does not necessarily release states from the fiscal constraints under which they would otherwise 
operate. 
The Association of State Budget Officers reports that state balanced budget requirements 
generally take three forms, with many states operating under two or even all three of the 
requirements.  1) The governor’s proposed budget must be balanced; 2) The enacted budget must 
be balanced; and 3) No deficit can be carried forward from one fiscal period into the next.
62
  
Further, some states require that the governor sign a balanced budget.
63
  State constitutions and 
statutes do not always explicitly require these steps, but courts have read them to exist. 
State balanced budget provisions also vary in the availability of enforcement 
mechanisms. 
64
 In a very few states, mandatory spending reductions are required if expenditures 
would otherwise exceed revenue.  Some states provide for criminal punishment of officials who 
authorize deficit spending.  In other states, governors monitor expenditures and are required to 
make cuts during the fiscal year to ensure that the budget remains in balance.  Some states may 
                                                                                                                                                             
look at state balanced budget requirements, see U.S. GEN. ACCOUNTING OFFICE, BALANCED BUDGET 
REQUIREMENTS: STATE EXPERIENCES AND IMPLICATIONS FOR THE FEDERAL GOVERNMENT (1993). 
62
 NAT’L ASS’N OF STATE BUDGET OFFICERS, BUDGET PROCESSES IN THE STATES 40 (2008), available at 
http://nasbo.org/LinkClick.aspx?fileticket=AaAKTnjgucg=&tabid=80 cited in NAT’L CONFERENCE OF STATE 
LEGISLATURES, NCSL FISCAL BRIEF: STATE BALANCED BUDGET PROVISIONS 2-3 (2010), available at 
http://www.ncsl.org/documents/fiscal/StateBalancedBudgetProvisions2010.pdf. 
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 NAT’L CONFERENCE OF STATE LEGISLATURES, supra note x, at 5. 
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Beermann, Public Pension Crisis, 9/23/2012 
 
31 
 
also simply prohibit the paying of bills if funds have run out.  Some states are more liberal, 
allowing borrowing at the end of the fiscal year to satisfy outstanding obligations.  The 
overriding factor may be the political culture of state government.  Even in states with uncertain 
enforcement, operating budgets remain balanced because the political costs of running an illegal 
deficit would simply be too high. 
Ironically, state balanced budget requirements are negatively correlated with pension 
funding to full actuarial standards.
65
  In other words, states with strict balanced budget 
requirements are less likely than other states to fully fund their projected future pension 
obligations.  The reason for this may be simple:  When balanced budget requirements are likely 
to be strictly enforced, expenditures are moved to areas that do not constitute deficit spending.  
Because pension promises are an off-budget method of providing compensation to state 
employees for current services, the larger the share that can be paid in the form of deferred 
compensation, the more services government can provide out of current revenue.  Further, in 
tight fiscal times, the tendency for state governments to reduce or suspend pension funding for 
one or more years
66
 to avoid serious cuts to current services, can aggravate pension fund deficits 
during bad economic times when stock market downturns reduce pension fund investment values 
and state tax revenue declines.
 67
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 See Chaney et al, supra note x, at 307. 
66
 See REPORT OF THE STATE BUDGET CRISIS TASK FORCE, supra note x, at 37-38.  The Report contains a detailed 
discussion of state and local underpayment of projected pension liabilities and reform efforts that may make it more 
difficult in some states for government entities to continue underpaying.  This, in turn, would lead to more stress on 
already tight state and local budgets.  See id. at 40-41. 
67
 THAD CALABRESE, SOC’Y OF ACTUARIES, PUBLIC PENSIONS, PUBLIC BUDGETS, AND THE RISKS OF PENSION 
OBLIGATION BONDS, 3 (2010), available at http://www.soa.org/library/monographs/ 
retirement-systems/public-pension-finance/2010/june/mono-2010-mrs10-calabrese.pdf. 
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The relative freedom of states to determine their own discount rates also contributes to 
the general underfunding of pension obligations.  States can tinker with pension growth forecasts 
and discount rates to make it appear that they are funding future obligations adequately or 
creating only a relatively small funding gap when they decrease their contributions to bridge 
budget gaps.
68
  These temporary budget fixes contribute to cumulative problems, since later 
budgets do not make up for the earlier gap in funding.  States may also issue pension obligation 
bonds to meet required annual contribution requirements, but this move passes the cost on to 
future generations of taxpayers who must pay the bonds and may also need additional funds to 
make up for underfunding due to inflated discount rates.
69
  Thus, the short-term nature of state 
budgeting and the inapplicability of “balanced budget” requirements conspire to create a long-
term mess of underfunded pension obligations. 
This should be discouraging to those who champion balanced budget requirements as 
devices to bring fiscal constraint to government.  Underfunding future pension obligations shares 
many of the vices of deficit spending and is different from long-term borrowing for capital 
projects, because pension promises are more like operating expenses than capital borrowing.  
While deficit spending may make sense when economic stimulus is desired, for programs that do 
not promise to grow the economy for the future, it is a simple inter-generational wealth transfer, 
with current taxpayers pushing off the expense of providing current government services to 
future taxpayers.  For the most part, pension promises fall into this category.  Generous, secure 
                                                 
68
 Id. States have more leeway than private entities to alter their discount rates because they generally follow the 
pension standards set by the Governmental Accounting Standards Board rather than the market-based standards 
established by the Financial Accounting Standards Board.  See also JOSH BARRO & STUART BUCK, MANHATTAN 
INST., UNDERFUNDED TEACHER PENSION PLANS: IT’S WORSE THAN YOU THINK (2010), available at 
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pension promises allow government employers to pay their employees less in current cash 
compensation.   Underfunding pension obligations means that future taxpayers will essentially 
pay the bill for services provided in the past without any current benefit, such as a building, park, 
or highway, that is still being used while bond payments are made.  An effective state balanced 
budget requirement would thus include advance funding (under realistic projections and discount 
rates) of pension and retiree health care promises to public employees as part of the current 
operating expenses required, under state law, to be part of a balanced budget. 
B. State Law Limitations on Pension Reform
70
 
1. Pension Flexibility under State Law 
In many states, the weight of constitutional law is with state employees rather than the 
taxpaying public.
71
  In a comprehensive review of state pension plan protections, Amy Monahan 
has demonstrated that many states protect pension plan participants from significant 
modifications to their plans, under both constitutional and contract law theories.
72
  In another 
article, Monahan reports that “courts in California and the twelve other states that have adopted 
California's precedent have held not only that state retirement statutes create contracts, but that 
                                                 
70
 Although state statutory and constitutional protections of public pensions are distinct from federal law, except 
perhaps in states with very specific constitutional protections for pension promises, the considerations state judges 
use to decide whether to protect pensions under state law are very similar to the considerations they use to determine 
whether a reform violates the federal Contracts Clause.  Generally, once a state court finds that an employee has a 
contractual right to a feature of a pension plan, the court finds a violation of either state pension provisions or federal 
constitutional law. 
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 For a general discussion of the legal status of public pension reform, see David L. Gregory, The Problematic 
Status of Employee Compensation and Retiree Pension Security: Resisting the State, Reforming the Corporation, 5 
B.U. PUB. INT. L.J. 37 (1995).  
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 Amy Monahan, Public Pension Plan Reform: The Legal Framework, 5 EDUC. FIN. & POL’Y 617 (2010). 
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they do so as of the first day of employment.”73  Jonathan Forman concludes that state law places 
serious constraints on pension reform with regard to existing workers:  “Through state 
constitutional provisions and court interpretations of property and contract rights, most states 
essentially guarantee that their public workers will get the pensions that they were promised 
when they were hired.”74 
Some state constitutions contain provisions that explicitly prohibit the state from 
reducing pension payments or pension promises to state employees.  For example, the New York 
Constitution provides that “[a]fter July first, nineteen hundred forty, membership in any pension 
or retirement system of the state or of a civil division thereof shall be a contractual relationship, 
the benefits of which shall not be diminished or impaired.”75  This has been interpreted to protect 
the level of benefits promised as of the date that the employee became eligible to participate in 
the pension plan.
76
  Similarly, the Michigan constitution provides that “[t]he accrued financial 
benefits of each pension plan and retirement system of the state and its political subdivisions 
shall be a contractual obligation thereof which shall not be diminished or impaired thereby.”77  
States with provisions like these may be unable to reduce pension payments or promises to state 
workers even if the magnitude and nature of pension promises is in serious tension with state 
balanced budget requirements.  It should also be noted that many state courts use the federal 
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 Amy B. Monahan, Statutes as Contracts? The “California Rule” and its Impact on Public Pension Reform, 97 
Iowa L. Rev. 1029, 1032 (2012).  Monahan is highly critical of this line of cases, finding it to be inconsistent with 
more general legal principles concerning flexibility in government regulatory programs.  This is discussed further 
infra at x. 
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 Forman, supra note x, at 866. 
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 N.Y. CONST. art. V, § 7. 
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 See Kleinfeldt v. New York City Emp. Ret. Sys., 36 N.Y.2d 95, 101-102 (1975); McCaffrey v. Bd. of Ed. of E. 
Meadow Union Free Sch. Dist., 48 A.D.2d 853 (N.Y. App. Div. 1975). 
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Contract Clause to protect pension promises, finding first, a contractual relationship under state 
law, and then protecting employee rights under federal constitutional law.
78
 
Most states recognize that public pension rights vest at some point, after which the state 
is precluded from amending the contractual promises.  The most common point at which rights 
are solidified under state law is when an employee satisfies the requirements for grant of the 
pension, commonly referred to as “vesting,” which usually occurs at some point after the onset 
of employment and before retirement.
79
  Some states’ law is even more favorable toward 
employees, recognizing pension rights from the onset of government employment.  Courts in 
these states reason that “by accepting the job and continuing work, the employee has accepted 
                                                 
78
 See, e.g., Oregon State Police Officers’ Ass’n v. State, 323 Or. 356 (1996) (state constitutional amendments 
altering employee contribution amounts, prohibiting guaranteed rates of return on pension funds and prohibiting 
inclusion of unused sick leave in pension calculations violated Contract Clause rights of employees); Singer v. City 
of Topeka, 227 Kan. 356 (1980) (changes in retirement benefits promises violated contractually protected rights and 
therefore violated federal Contract Clause). 
79
 Many decisions recognize vested rights in dicta while denying claims brought by employees who sue over pension 
reform before they are actually eligible to retire.  See, e.g., Petras v. State Bd. of Pension Trustees, 464 A.2d 894, 
896 (Del. 1983) (a teacher possessed no contractual right to receive credit for time spent teaching in other states 
because the teacher’s pension rights had not yet vested when the state legislature amended its credit policy); Baker 
v. Oklahoma Firefighters Pension & Ret. Sys., 718 P.2d 348, 353 (Okla. 1986) (only those firefighters and police 
officers “who had retired or who could have retired and become eligible for payment of pension benefits” possessed 
pension rights that the state legislature could not detrimentally change with subsequent legislation).  For similar 
holdings, see also Bd. of Trustees v. Cary, 373 So.2d 841, 842-43 (Ala. 1979); Pyle v. Webb, 489 S.W.2d 796, 798 
(1973); Police Pension & Relief Bd. v. McPhail, 338 P.2d 694, 700 (Colo. 1959) (“Until an employee has earned his 
retirement pay, or until the time arrives when he may retire, his retirement pay is but an inchoate right . . . .” (citation 
omitted)); City of Jacksonville Beach v. State ex rel. O'Donald, 151 So.2d 430, 431-32 (Fla. 1963); Hickey v. 
Pension Bd., 106 A.2d 233, 236 (Pa. 1954); Ellis v. Utah State Ret. Bd., 757 P.2d, 882, 886 (Utah 1988); Leonard v. 
City of Seattle, 503 P.2d 741, 746 (Wash. 1972) (en banc) (explaining that “[e]ven before ripening finally, and 
during the years of its accrual, it was more than an expectancy and more than an enforceable promise or a contract; 
it gave him steadily accruing rights in and to the pension fund itself”); Campbell v. Michigan Judges Ret. Bd., 143 
N.W.2d 755, 756-58 (Mich. 1966) (concerning voluntary pension contributions); but see Brown v. City of Highland 
Park, 30 N.W.2d 798, 800 (Mich. 1948) (asserting that where public employee membership in pension systems is 
mandatory, the accompanying pension benefits are not a part of the contract of employment and can be amended by 
the legislature). 
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the State's offer of retirement benefits, and the State may not impair or abrogate that contract 
without offering consideration and obtaining the consent of the employee.”80 
Some states take a reliance interest approach to the question of whether an employee has 
a vested right to pension benefits that is protected under constitutional or contractual principles.
81
 
For example, the West Virginia Supreme Court has reasoned: 
When considering the constitutionality of legislative amendments to pension 
plans, an employee's eligibility for a pension does not determine whether he or she has 
vested contract rights. Instead, the determination of an employee's vested contract rights 
concerns whether the employee has sufficient years of service in the system that he or she 
can be considered to have relied substantially to his or her detriment on the existing 
pension benefits and contribution schedules.
82
 
With sufficient length of service, reliance is presumed,
83
 but only on those provisions that are in 
effect during the lengthy service. 
This approach to determining whether the state may alter pension benefits requires that 
the court determine in each case whether the employee has relied on the particular provision that 
has been altered, especially with regard to provisions that were not in effect during the entire 
period of employment.  For example, in 1988, the West Virginia legislature amended that state’s 
public pension statute to include lump-sum payments for unused vacation time in retiring 
employees’ final salary for pension calculations.84  Apparently many employees took early 
retirement shortly after the amendment passed so they could take advantage of this method of 
increasing their pension payments.  Then, in 1989, the legislature repealed the provision.  When 
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 Proska v. Arizona State Sch. for the Deaf & Blind, 74 P.3d 939, 942 (Ariz. 2003). 
81
 For an argument that reliance should be the key issue in Contract Clause jurisprudence, see Robert A. Graham, 
Note, The Constitution, The Legislature, and Unfair Surprise: Toward A Reliance-Based Approach to the Contract 
Clause, 92 MICH. L. REV. 398 (1993). 
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 Booth v. Sims, 193 W. Va. 323, 337 (1995). 
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 Id. at 340. 
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Donald Adams retired in 1996, he sought to have a lump sum payment for his unused vacation 
time included in his final salary for pension purposes even though the provision allowing this 
had been repealed in 1989.
85
  The trial court dismissed Adams’s claim, but the West Virginia 
Supreme Court ruled that Adams was entitled to an opportunity to prove his allegation  
that in 1988 he made a decision to continue his employment with the State in reliance 
upon the 1988 version of [the retirement statute], and expected that he would be able to 
add his accrued but unpaid leave to his final average salary when he retired, and would 
thereby receive an increased monthly retirement benefit.
86
 
Without specific evidence of reliance, the particular pension benefit would not be vested 
and the state would be able to eliminate or modify it.  For example, when Rodney Myers and 
another employee retired in the late 1990s, they also sought to have lump sum payments for 
unused vacation time included in their final salaries on the basis that they relied on the 1988 
provision by remaining employed by the state for ten years after the 1988 amendment was 
adopted.  The West Virginia Supreme Court denied the claim, concluding that reliance on a 
provision that was in effect for only one year cannot be presumed and; 
neither [plaintiff] presented any specific evidence indicating that they relied to their 
detriment on this specific provision.  [N]either of the Appellees in this case was eligible 
to retire during the year this benefit was in effect and, thus,  . . .  neither of the Appellees 
could have based any retirement decision on the promise contained in the 1988 
amendment. Indeed, neither Appellee introduced any evidence to show that he made any 
decision whatsoever on the basis of that particular promised benefit.
87
 
Although, as Monahan reports, California protects pension promises from the first day of 
employment, some California decisions take a nuanced view of reliance, balancing employees’ 
interest in pension benefits against the state’s need for flexibility and control.  The California 
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Supreme Court has stated that “[t]he employee does not obtain, prior to retirement, any absolute 
right to fixed or specific benefits, but only to a ‘substantial or reasonable pension.’”88  It is 
unclear, however, how far this apparent flexibility goes, because California cases also state that 
normally any reduction in pension benefits must be compensated for by other aspects of the 
reform provisions.
89
  Further, there are California cases that appear to mechanically enforce 
provisions of pension laws in effect during employment, even when that results in what may be 
seen as abusive double-increases in benefits.
90
 
In addition to the contract-based protections employees enjoy, labor law may provide 
another layer of protection.  State and local governments may not be able to unilaterally alter 
pension benefits for employees in bargaining units engaged in collective bargaining.  Because 
retiree benefits are often specified in collective bargaining agreements, any unilateral attempt to 
alter them may be considered a breach of contract, no matter how weighty the government 
interest behind the need for reform.
91
  Thus, for unionized sectors, reform may depend on 
successful collective bargaining. 
In some states, the law goes further than protecting benefits levels and also protects 
funding levels, requiring an actuarially adequate level of annual contributions to pension funds.
92
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 Betts v. Bd. of Admin., 21 Cal.3d 859, 873 (1968) (quoting Wallace v. City of Fresno, 42 Cal.2d 180, 183 (1954).  
89
 Allen v. City of Long Beach, 45 Cal.2d 128, 131(1955)) (“changes in a pension plan which result in disadvantage 
to employees should be accompanied by comparable new advantages.”) (emphasis supplied).  Because of relatively 
strict application of this requirement, Monahan views the California decisions as much more favorable to employees 
than the language from Betts might imply.  See Monahan, Statutes as Contracts?, supra note x at 1062-64. 
90
 Betts, 21 Cal.3d at 867 (“We fully recognize that the effect of our holding is that petitioner thereby receives the 
benefit of a double increment of increase, a troubling result. We can only observe that the Legislature must have 
intended to provide such benefits to constitutional officers serving between 1963 and 1974 because it left in effect 
both of the formulae during that 11-year period.”). 
91
 See City of Philadelphia v. District Council 33, 598 A.2d 256, 259-60 (Pa. 1991) (city imposition of new pension 
scheme breached collective bargaining agreement and possibly unconstitutionally impaired contract). 
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 For a discussion of cases involving funding levels, see Simko, supra note x, at 1065-79. 
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For example, in elaborating on state statutes that create contractual guarantees in pension 
benefits to public employees, the North Carolina Appeals Court stated, “it is clear that Plaintiffs 
had a contractual right to the funding of the Retirement System in an actuarially sound manner.  
Therefore, we hold that the right to have the Retirement System funded in an actuarially sound 
manner is a term or condition included in Plaintiffs' retirement contracts.”93  The North Carolina 
court cited decisions from several other jurisdictions for the proposition that actuarially sound 
funding can be a contractually protected term of a pension program.
94
 
Other states recognize that the legislature should have discretion over funding decisions 
and protect only the ultimate pension payments and not the funding of pension funds.  For 
example, in Illinois, pension participants and funds themselves challenged a statute that changed 
the method of calculating government contributions to pension funds.  They argued that the new 
statute violated the Illinois Constitution’s pension protection provision: “Membership in any 
pension or retirement system of the State, any unit of local government or school district, or any 
agency or instrumentality thereof, shall be an enforceable contractual relationship, the benefits of 
which shall not be diminished or impaired.”95  The Illinois Supreme Court held that this 
provision relates only to benefits and not to the “politically sensitive area of pension funding.”96 
                                                 
93
 Stone v. State, 191 N.C. App. 402, 414 (N.C. App. 2008). 
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 See id. at 415 (citing Municipality of Anchorage v. Gallion, 944 P.2d 436 (Alaska 1997)); Dadisman v. Moore, 
181 W. Va. 779 (1988); Valdes v. Cory, 139 Cal. App.3d 773 (1983); Sgaglione v. Levitt, 37 N.Y.2d 507 (1975); 
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Ill.2d 266 (1975).  The court cited cases in which it had invalidated legislation that reduced pension benefits, but 
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Judicial insistence on adequate funding would prevent some of the most serious missteps 
that have contributed to the funding crisis.
 97
  It would reduce the tendency of states to use 
pension obligations as a form of deficit spending, pushing off payment for current services onto 
future taxpayers.  Underfunding of pension funds is sometimes systematic, as when states use 
unrealistic projected rates of return on pension funds to justify underfunding; and sometimes it is 
episodic, as when states decide to cut pension contributions to balance the state budget during 
difficult fiscal times.
98
  While legitimate questions can be raised over whether the courts should 
prevent the government from allocating funds as it sees fit, judicial compulsion in this context 
maybe the least of several potential evils. 
It should not be surprising that the law in many states is very protective of public 
employees’ and retirees’ pension expectations.  For the most part, the employees have traditional 
contract principles on their side, and in the typical case, they have legitimately relied on their 
                                                                                                                                                             
(1993), in which the New York Court of Appeals had invalidated a provision removing the New York Comptroller’s 
power to require actuarially adequate contributions to pension funds.  See also Jones v. Bd. of Trustees of Kentucky 
Ret. Sys., 910 S.W.2d 710 (Ky. 1995) (state legislature had power to amend method of calculating public employer 
contribution to retirement fund without unconstitutionally impairing contracts).   
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 Some full funding requirements may go too far.  The United States Postal Service is legally required to fund its 
pension and retiree health care obligations in advance.  This has proven to be a hardship to the Postal Service, and 
due to its general downturn in business, it is likely to fail to make its advance health care payments for 2011 and 
2012.  See Ron Nixon, Postal Service Set to Default on Billions in Health Fund Payments, N.Y. TIMES, July 18, 
2012; Hope Yen, Postal service to default on $11.1b bill, ASSOCIATED PRESS, July 31, 2012. 
98
 For example, the challenge in Stone v. State resulted from an executive order issued by the North Carolina’s 
governor diverting pension contributions to balance the budget.  See Stone v. State, 191 N.C. App. 402, 414 (N.C. 
App. 2008).  It appears common that in difficult fiscal times, pension contributions are reduced.  From the 
perspective of the government employee, using underfunding as a reason for cutting benefits may appear to be 
manipulative.  Legislators promise generous pension benefits knowing they will underfund them and be able to use 
the underfunding later as an excuse for reform.  This conspiracy theory may be far-fetched in the amount of the 
advance planning it entails, but it may not seem so to the public employee suffering cuts to promised benefits.  Zach 
Carter’s Huffington Post article accuses conservative state governors of creating the pension funding crisis to 
finance tax cuts and justify pension reductions to state workers.  See Carter, supra note x.  Regarding New Jersey, 
Carter reports that “During the 1990s, under Gov. Christine Todd Whitman (R), the state slashed its annual pension 
contributions in order to finance a slate of tax cuts, and didn't begin seriously boosting those contributions until 
2007.  . . .  Last year, Gov. Chris Christie (R) took a page from Whitman's playbook, forgoing the $3 billion annual 
state contribution to the pension plan while pushing $1 billion in tax cuts for the state's wealthiest citizens.” 
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employers’ retirement promises.   These state courts recognize that it would be grossly unfair to 
employees if their retirement savings were subject to the political and fiscal winds that might 
lead state and local legislative bodies to make significant cuts to their pensions.
99
 
III. Federal constitutional law constraints on state pension reform 
Assuming that state law allows it, the next issue to explore concerns federal constitutional 
constraints on state pension reform.  The primary federal constitutional provision that restrains 
states here is the Contract Clause, which prohibits states from passing “any . . . Law impairing 
the Obligation of Contracts.”100  Additionally, the Takings Clause may limit states’ ability to 
reduce pension payments to some state workers. 
A. The Contract Clause and Pension Reform 
There has been a good deal of litigation in both state and federal courts concerning the 
application of the Contract Clause to state pension reform.
101
  It was understood from very early 
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 A recent report released by the Center for Retirement Research at Boston College argues for a sharp distinction 
between benefits earned for past service and benefits expected based on future service.  See Alicia H. Munnell and 
Laura Quinby, Legal Constraints on Changes in State and Local Pensions (2012), available at http://crr.bc.edu/wp-
content/uploads/2012/08/slp_25.pdf.  Their main argument in favor of flexibility is that public pension benefits 
should be subject to the same economic considerations as private pensions.  See id. at 3.  In general, private 
companies can reduce pension promises prospectively, i.e. while pension promises based on past service may not be 
reduced, pension promises based on future service can be reduced along with other elements of future compensation.  
The authors of the report recognize that in some states, this would require a constitutional amendment.  Id.   Munnell 
and Quinby’s treatment is more balanced than that of some analysts who do not seem to recognize the legitimate 
reliance interests government workers have in their pension benefits. 
100
 U.S. CONST. art. 1, § 10. 
101
 Early Supreme Court decisions on this subject are not favorable to pension plan participants’ claims.  In 1889, the 
Court characterized public pensions as gratuities that could be withdrawn at any time.  Pennie v. Reis, 132 U.S. 464 
(1889).  Later, the Court held that a new statute reducing payments under a prior statute to those already receiving 
their pensions did not violate the Contract Clause.  See Dodge v. Bd. of Educ. of City of Chicago, 302 U.S. 74, 81 
(1937).  Neither of these cases has been overruled, and in fact Dodge was cited with approval as recently as 1985.  
However, due to the significant changes to the law governing constitutional protection of state benefits over the last 
50 years, it would be unwise to treat the issues addressed in this article as settled by those decisions.  See Note, 90 
Harv. L. Rev., supra note x, at 996. 
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on that the Contract Clause applied both to state laws impairing private contracts and state laws 
impairing the obligation of the state’s own contracts.102  However, in the early cases, the 
Supreme Court refused to protect legislative pension promises under the Due Process Clause
103
 
or the Contract Clause.
104
  In neither case, however, did the Court categorically rule out 
protecting the pension promises.  In the later of the cases, which more closely resembles the 
current approach under the Contract Clause, the Court found no contractual right based largely 
on decisions of the particular state supreme court finding that the legislation in question was not 
intended to preclude subsequent revision of the plan involved. 
Although at one time it might have seemed that the primary focus of the Contract Clause 
was on state regulation of private contracts, more recently, recognizing the potential for state and 
local governments to use their sovereign immunity to take advantage of contractual partners, the 
Supreme Court has stated that the Contract Clause applies more strictly to States’ contracts than 
to private contracts.
105
  The First Circuit has observed stricter scrutiny of impairments to the 
state’s own contracts can be attributed to the fact that “‘the State’s self-interest is at stake.’”106 
The Contracts Clause, however, is not understood today as an absolute bar on laws 
altering state pension obligations (and other state promises).
107
  Rather, the standard that has 
                                                 
102
 See Fletcher v. Peck, 10 U.S. 87, 138 (1810). 
103
 Penne v. Reis, 132 U.S. 464 (1889) (abolition of pension plan and transfer of funds deducted from employees’ 
paychecks to other purposes does not violate pension plan beneficiaries’ due process rights). 
104
 Dodge v. Bd. of Educ. of City of Chicago, 302 U.S. 74 (1937). 
105
 U.S. Trust Co. of New York v. New Jersey, 431 U.S. 1 (1977). 
106
 Parker v. Wakelin, 123 F.3d 1, 5 (1
st
 Cir. 1997) (quoting U.S. Trust Co. of New York, 431 U.S. at 26). 
107
 See U.S. Trust Co. of New York, 431 U.S. at 25 (footnote omitted) (“The Contract Clause is not an absolute bar 
to subsequent modification of a State's own financial obligations.  As with laws impairing the obligations of private 
contracts, an impairment may be constitutional if it is reasonable and necessary to serve an important public 
purpose.”).  It may be that under the original understanding of the Contract Clause, all retrospective modifications of 
contractual obligations would be considered unconstitutional.  See Douglas W. Kmiec & John O. McGinnis, The 
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developed in the federal courts to decide whether pension reform violates the Contracts Clause 
has two elements:  1) does the change in state law result in a “substantial impairment of a 
contractual relationship,”108 and if so, 2) is this impairment justified as “‘reasonable and 
necessary to serve an important public purpose’”?109  Thus, there must be both a contractual 
relationship and a substantial impairment, and even when that is present, an important public 
purpose is sufficient to uphold the impairment.
110
 
The second element, allowing impairment to be justified as “reasonable and necessary to 
serve an important public purpose,” reads like a form of intermediate scrutiny.  The state law 
must be more than merely rationally believed to serve a legitimate purpose, which would be the 
test under the lowest level of constitutional scrutiny.   
The first element, whether there has been a substantial impairment of a contractual 
relationship, can itself be divided into three separate inquiries: first, whether a contractual 
relationship exists; second, whether any such relationship has been impaired; and third, whether 
any impairment is substantial. 
111
 
When determining whether a protected contractual relationship exists, courts are very 
sensitive to states’ interest in remaining flexible and retaining their full regulatory authority.  
This judicial instinct in the United States dates back at least to the famous Charles River Bridge 
                                                                                                                                                             
Contract Clause: A Return to the Original Understanding,14 HASTINGS CONST. L.Q. 525 (1987).  However, as the 
authors point out, the Clause is not so understood by the Supreme Court today. 
108
 Parker v. Wakelin, 123 F.3d 1, 5 (1st Cir. 1997) (internal quotation mark omitted) (quoting Gen. Motors Corp. v. 
Romein, 503 U.S. 181, 186 (1992)). 
109
 Id. (quoting U.S. Trust Co. of New York, 431 U.S. at 25); see also Energy Reserves Group, Inc. v. Kansas Power 
& Light Co., 459 U.S. 400, 411-12 (1983).  Some courts have discussed this test as having three prongs.  See, e.g., 
McGrath v. Rhode Island Ret. Bd., 88 F.3d 12, 16 (1st Cir. 1996). 
110
 For a detailed examination of Contract Clause protection of public pensions, see Monahan, supra note x. 
111
 Gen. Motors Corp., 503 U.S. at 186. 
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case
112
 in which the Supreme Court held that a company operating a toll bridge under a state 
charter could not prevent the state from chartering another bridge which, when its tolls expired a 
few years after opening, would drive the first bridge out of business.  In the course of 
determining that the Charles River Bridge operators did not have an exclusive franchise over 
river crossings in the area, the Court expressed concern that a contrary finding would prevent 
state governments from acting in the public interest.  As Chief Justice Taney stated in his opinion 
for the Court rejecting an implied intention of the state to create a binding exclusive contract;  
still less will it be found, where sovereign rights are concerned, and where the interests of 
a whole community would be deeply affected by such an implication. It would, indeed, 
be a strong exertion of judicial power, acting upon its own views of what justice required, 
and the parties ought to have done, to raise, by a sort of judicial coercion, an implied 
contract[.] 
Early cases refusing to recognize vested rights in pension payments clearly rested their 
analysis on the need to preserve regulatory flexibility over pension payments to retired state 
workers.  Just as Congress remains free to adjust the Social Security program by increasing the 
retirement age, delaying or reducing cost of living allowances, increasing payroll tax deductions, 
imposing income tax on benefits payments and even reducing benefits payments, the Supreme 
Court has recognized state flexibility in pension terms.  As the Court stated very clearly in 1985, 
the presumption against finding a contractual obligation in pension promises 
is grounded in the elementary proposition that the principal function of a legislature is not 
to make contracts, but to make laws that establish the policy of the state. Indiana ex rel. 
Anderson v. Brand, 303 U.S. 95, 104-105 (1938). Policies, unlike contracts, are 
inherently subject to revision and repeal, and to construe laws as contracts when the 
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 Proprietors of Charles River Bridge v. Proprietors of Warren Bridge, 36 U.S. 420 (1837). 
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obligation is not clearly and unequivocally expressed would be to limit drastically the 
essential powers of a legislative body. Indeed, “‘[t]he continued existence of a 
government would be of no great value, if by implications and presumptions, it was 
disarmed of the powers necessary to accomplish the ends of its creation.’” Keefe v. 
Clark, 322 U.S. 393, 397 (1944) (quoting Charles River Bridge v. Warren Bridge, 36 
U.S. (11 Pet.) 420, 548 (1837)). Thus, the party asserting the creation of a contract must 
overcome this well-founded presumption, Dodge, supra, 302 U.S., at 79, and we proceed 
cautiously both in identifying a contract within the language of a regulatory statute and in 
defining the contours of any contractual obligation.
113
 
In light of these concerns, the courts have developed a strong clear statement principle for 
determining whether a contractual relationship with the state exists.
114
  The standard in this area 
has been referred to as the “unmistakeability doctrine,”115 requiring that the state’s intent to be 
contractually bound be “‘expressed in terms too plain to be mistaken.’”116  The purposes of the 
unmistakeability doctrine are to preserve state flexibility in the exercise of sovereign power and 
                                                 
113
 Nat'l R.R. Passenger Corp. v. Atchison Topeka & Santa Fe Ry. Co. 470 U.S. 451 (1985). 
114
 A related doctrine, the “sovereign acts doctrine” protects similar interests.  As explained by Joshua Schwartz: 
These doctrines preserve the government's ability to respond effectively to changed circumstances that call 
for a policy response without undue inhibition because of the collateral effects such a response may have 
upon subsisting government contracts.  At the same time, these rules of law should be framed so as to 
provide appropriate protection to the reliance and expectation interests of the government's contractual 
partners.  Indeed, the government shares a long-range interest in achieving a legal regime in which the risks 
borne by its contractors do not stand as a barrier to entry into a competitive market for government 
contracts.  Finally, in striking a balance between governmental and contractors' interests, the sovereign acts 
and unmistakability doctrines must also maintain the constitutional separation of powers among the 
branches of the federal government. 
Joshua I. Schwartz, Liability for Sovereign Acts: Congruence and Exceptionalism in. Government Contracts Law, 
64 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 633 (1996) 
115
 See Parker, 123 F.3d at 5. 
116
 Id. at 5 (quoting United States v. Winstar Corp, 518 U.S. 839, 875 (1996)). 
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to avoid the difficult constitutional questions that arise if a contractual obligation is found.
117
  
Due to the strong presumption against finding a contractual obligation, there are no clear 
standards governing the determination.
118
  Rather, all of the facts and circumstances surrounding 
each alleged contract must be closely examined to determine whether the state legislature 
intended to create a contractual relationship.
119
 
It is not altogether clear that the analogy between public pension benefits and cases like 
Charles River Bridge and even Social Security reform legislation is apt.  Unlike the typical 
regulatory program, pension benefits are earned through government employment and, especially 
with regard to past services, are compensation for work already performed.  In employment 
situations, perhaps the presumption should be flipped—it ought to be presumed that promises 
made based on employment are intended to be contractual.  Otherwise, state and local employers 
would be free to take advantage of employees in exactly the way that the Contract Clause, as 
applied to government’s own contracts, is supposed to prevent.  Further, allowing state and local 
governments complete freedom to alter employee benefits retroactively could hamper public 
                                                 
117
 See United States v. Winstar Corp., 518 U.S. 839, 871-91 (1996).  Justice Souter’s plurality opinion in Winstar 
relied upon the purposes of the unmistakeability doctrine to argue that the strength of the doctrine should be 
calibrated to reflect the extent to which a particular contract limits sovereign powers.  Contracts that would limit 
important powers such as the taxing power should be subject to a strict unmistakeability doctrine while “humdrum 
supply contracts” should not.  Id. at 880.  For a look at the implications of Winstar, see Joshua I. Schwartz, The 
Status of the Sovereign Acts Doctrine and Unmistakeability Doctrines in the Wake of Winstar: An Interim Report, 51 
ALABAMA L. REV. 1177 (2000).  
118
 The high bar to finding a contractual obligation stands in contrast to the relatively easier time government 
workers and government benefits recipients have in establishing property interests in their jobs or benefits.  Under 
the test developed under Board of Regents v. Roth, 408 U.S. 564 (1972), government benefits and employment are 
considered property under federal law whenever ascertainable standards govern their award and termination.  
Accrued pension benefits are almost certainly property under federal law, despite outdated decisions such as Pennie 
v. Reis, 132 U.S. 464 (1889) which characterize public pensions as mere gratuities.  A finding that a pension 
promise is property would not, however, prevent the government from legislatively removing protections or 
depriving the employee of benefits for legal cause following a constitutionally adequate process.  This may explain 
why the Court has made it more difficult to find a contractual obligation than a property interest.  The Contract 
Clause provides substantive protection to the contractual interest, which means regardless of the procedure, it cannot 
be taken away.  By contrast, due process prohibits only deprivations accomplished without due process of law.   
119
 See Parker, 123 F.3d at 4. 
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employers’ ability to attract high quality employees or reduce employers’ flexibility regarding 
the timing of pay and benefits if employees refuse to accept insecure promises of deferred 
compensation.   With regard to Social Security, even though benefits are based on contributions, 
the case for allowing reform is still much stronger than in the government employment situation.  
People are likely to understand that Social Security is a government benefits program subject to 
legislative change.  
The high bar against finding a contractual obligation in pension contracts is illustrated by 
the First Circuit’s decision in Parker v. Wakelin, a case involving statutory amendments to 
Maine’s public employee retirement laws.  The amendments, enacted in 1993, made several 
changes to the pension system that were unfavorable to employees.  Some of the changes applied 
to all employees while others applied only to those employees with less than ten years of 
creditable service.  The changes that affected all employees included an increase in the required 
employee contribution to the pension plan (from 6.5 percent to 7.65 percent), a cap on salary 
increases that may be used in calculating pension benefits, and a six-month delay in a retiree’s 
first cost of living increase.  For employees with less than ten years of service, the minimum full 
pension retirement age was increased from 60 to 62, the penalty for retiring early was increased 
from 2.25 percent of the pension benefit to 6 percent of the pension benefit for each year before 
age 62, and the ability of employees to include unused sick and vacation pay in calculating 
pension benefits was eliminated.
120
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 See Parker, 123 F.3d at 3 nn. 3&4, discussing 5 M.R.S.A. §§ 17001(13)(B), 17001-B, 17701(13)(C), 17851(1-A) 
& (2-A), 17852(3-A) and 17806(3). 
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While many state courts treat pension promises as unilateral contracts that are entered 
into when the employee begins working,
121
  the First Circuit explicitly rejected a blanket rule 
treating all pensions that way.  Instead it chose to closely analyze Maine law to determine 
whether the State of Maine intended to bind itself to the pension promises made to employees as 
embodied in the statutory provisions as they existed before the amendments.
122
  The most 
significant indication of contractual intent on the part of the Maine legislature was a statute 
enacted in 1975 which states: 
No amendment to this chapter shall cause any reduction in the amount of benefits 
which would be due to the member based on creditable service, compensation, employee 
contributions and the provisions of this chapter on the date immediately preceding the 
effective date of such amendment.
123
 
This is a typical provision found in state law to protect public employee pensions.  The question 
is whether it satisfies the unmistakeability doctrine’s standard for finding intent to create a 
binding contract to maintain pension benefits as of the date a public employee was hired, i.e., 
whether it creates a contractual obligation. 
In Parker, the district court had found that no changes could be made to the potential 
benefits of Maine employees with enough service to retire before the changes took effect, but 
that the benefits of employees with some service but not enough to retire could be reduced.  The 
court of appeals viewed the question as turning on the meaning of the word “due” in the 1975 
                                                 
121
 See, e.g., Ass'n of Pennsylvania State Coll. & Univ. Faculties v. State Sys. of Higher Educ., 505 Pa. 369 (1984); 
Halpin v. Nebraska State Patrolmen’s Ret. Sys., 211 Neb. 892 (1982) (alteration in pension calculation method 
violated Contract Clause); Yeazell v. Copins, 98 Az. 109 (1965) (finding contractual obligation in legislative terms 
in effect at time employee entered employment). 
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 The Third Circuit has held that even in Pennsylvania where the state courts view pension promises as contractual, 
no contractual right exists if the pension plan explicitly provides that administrators have the power to make 
alterations to the plan.  See Transp. Workers Union of Am., Local 290 By & Through Fabio v. Se. Pennsylvania 
Transp. Auth., 145 F.3d 619 (3d Cir. 1998) 
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 P.L. 1975, ch. 622, § 6, codified at 5 M.R.S.A. § 17801. 
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statute quoted above.  If “due” means what would be payable if the employee retired, then the 
promise was contractual and the state could not alter the terms of the pension plan.  If, however, 
the word “due” refers to amounts actually due and owing, then only retired employees already 
receiving pension payments are protected because no amounts are “due” to an employee who has 
not already retired.  
Based in part on the reasoning of the Maine Supreme Court in an earlier case involving 
pension reform,
124
 the First Circuit held that the 1975 statute was not sufficient to create a 
contractual obligation in favor of any employee who had not yet retired, even if the employee 
was eligible to retire but had not yet done so.  In the earlier case, the Maine Supreme Judicial 
Court rejected the notion that pension terms become binding contractual promises at the moment 
of employment.
125
  The First Circuit reasoned that this indicates that the word “due” in the 1975 
statue does not refer to pension terms in effect at the time of employment.  However, the court 
recognized that this does not resolve the question whether pension terms might be “due” once an 
employee has sufficient creditable service, and is old enough, to retire.  For the First Circuit, in 
light of the Maine court’s understanding of the word “due”, the unmistakeability doctrine tipped 
the scales against finding a contractual obligation to employees who were eligible to retire.
126
  
Thus, all of the 1993 pension reforms could be applied to all non-retired Maine employees 
without violating the Contract Clause.  This is a relatively narrow understanding of the Contract 
Clause’s protection of government pension promises. 
                                                 
124
 Spiller v. State, 627 A.2d 513 (Me. 1993). 
125
 Id. 
126
 If, in a subsequent case, the Maine Supreme Judicial Court holds that the 1975 statute prohibits pension plan 
changes that alter the benefits that would be paid to employees already eligible to retire, the First Circuit’s 
conclusion would be subject to revision.  However, a case subsequent to such a determination by the Maine court is 
unlikely to arise in federal court because the state courts would have already prohibited the changes to the pension 
plan that might violate the Contract Clause.  
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A finding that a contractual right in pension benefits exists does not mean that pension 
reform measures are automatically unconstitutional.  As mentioned above, the Contract Clause 
prohibits only substantial impairments,
127
 (and, as discussed below, allows substantial 
impairments if they are “reasonable and necessary to serve an important public purpose.”128)  
There is no clear line in the caselaw between substantial and insubstantial impairments.
129
  The 
central inquiry appears to be whether the complaining party actually relied on the altered term or 
terms.  As one court put it: 
In determining whether an impairment is substantial and so not “permitted under 
the Constitution,” of greatest concern appears to be the contracting parties' actual reliance 
on the abridged contractual term. Specifically, the Supreme Court has examined contracts 
to determine whether the abridged right is one that was “reasonably relied” on by the 
complaining party,  . . . or one that “substantially induced” that party “to enter into the 
contract.”130    
For example, in a case involving an alleged impairment of municipal bonds issued by a 
water utility, the bondholders complained that their Contract Clause rights were violated when 
the water utility was no longer legally entitled to place a lien on property based on a default by a 
tenant.
131
  When the bonds were issued, default by a tenant allowed the utility to place a lien on 
the land even if the owner had not contracted for service. This increased the likelihood of 
payment after default.  The court concluded that a loss of the ability to place a lien on the 
landlord’s property after default by a tenant was not a substantial impairment of the contract: 
                                                 
127
 Gen. Motors Corp. v. Romein, 503 U.S. 181, 186 (1992). 
128
 Parker v. Wakelin, 123 F.3d 1, 5 (1st Cir. 1997) (quoting U.S. Trust Co. of New York v. New Jersey, 431 U.S. 1, 
25 (1977)); see also Energy Reserves Group, Inc. v. Kansas Power & Light Co., 459 U.S. 400, 411-12 (1983). 
129
 See Baltimore Teachers Union, Am. Fed'n of Teachers Local 340, AFL-CIO v. Mayor & City Council of 
Baltimore, 6 F.3d 1012, 1017 (4th Cir. 1993) (the “Supreme Court has provided little specific guidance as to what 
constitutes a ‘substantial’ contract impairment.”). 
130
 City of Charleston v. Pub. Serv. Comm'n of W. Virginia, 57 F.3d 385, 392 (4
th
 Cir. 1995) (quoting Allied 
Structural Steel Co. v. Spannaus, 438 U.S. 234, 246 (1978); City of El Paso v. Simmons, 379 U.S. 497, 514 (1965)). 
131
 City of Charleston v. Pub. Serv. Comm'n of W. Virginia, 57 F.3d 385 (4
th
 Cir. 1995). 
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The bond contracts themselves contain express acknowledgements that the 
parties' rights were subject to legislative regulation; there was a long established 
precedent of extensive state regulation of public utilities; the contracts were not abolished 
but merely modified; and the abridged right is, by its nature, not one central to the parties' 
undertaking.
132
 
Another factor that is relevant to whether there is a substantial impairment of a contract 
under the Contract Clause is whether the law has provided alternative benefits to the party whose 
rights have allegedly been impaired.  (As discussed above, this is also an important factor in 
some states for satisfying state law restrictions on pension modification.)   Rather than isolate the 
individual elements in the contractual agreement, courts holistically ask whether the parties’ 
overall situation has been made significantly worse.  For example, in the case involving the 
bondholders discussed above, in the year before the bondholders lost the right to place liens on 
landlords’ property, they gained the right, under state law, to terminate water service for 
nonpayment.  The court held that the addition of this very effective remedy for nonpayment 
meant that overall, there was not a substantial impairment of the bondholders’ contractual 
rights.
133
  In the pension reform area, this flexibility can be important as governments struggle to 
reduce their costs without harming employees who depend on the benefits. 
Amy Monahan concludes from her examination of the caselaw that in general, changes to 
the level of benefits and changes that affect the rights and responsibilities of employers are held 
to be substantial impairments.  In her view, except perhaps in extraordinary circumstances, 
changing the method for calculating benefits so that lower benefits are paid is likely to be found 
to be a substantial impairment of the contract.  Monahan points out, however, that some states, 
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such as California, allow substantial pension reform as “reasonable and necessary” impairments 
before retirement because, in their understanding of state law, employees have a right to a 
“substantial or reasonable pension” but not to a specific level of benefits.134 
Despite this recognition that California courts have allowed substantial pension reform as 
reasonable and necessary, Monahan is highly critical of California’s general approach to pension 
reform, an approach that she recognizes has been followed by at least a dozen more states.  
Monahan states that the California rule recognizing contractual rights in pension promises from 
the first day of employment is, for several reasons, “surprising”: 
First, it runs contrary to the well-established legal presumption that statutes do not 
create contractual rights absent clear and unambiguous evidence that the legislature 
intended to bind itself.  Second, courts interpreting the California Rule have held that the 
contract protects  . . . the rate of future accrual.  This interpretation is contrary to federal 
Contract Clause jurisprudence, which holds that prospective changes to a contract should 
not be considered unconstitutional impairments.  Third, not only is this interpretation 
contrary to general contract theory, it also appears to create economic inefficiency, in that 
it fixes in place one part of an employee's compensation.  . . . California courts have held 
that even though the state can terminate a worker, lower her salary, or reduce her other 
benefits, the state cannot decrease the worker's rate of pension accrual as long as she is 
employed. This framework can be welfare reducing. Given the option, an employee may 
prefer to accept lower future pension accruals in return for avoiding termination or a 
reduction in current compensation, but such deals are hard to accomplish in a system that 
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 Monahan, supra note x, at 628 (citing Betts v. Bd. of Admin., 21 Cal. 3d 859 (1978)). 
Beermann, Public Pension Crisis, 9/23/2012 
 
53 
 
protects the right to future accruals. It should also be noted that the protections the 
California Rule appears to offer are illusory, given that it simply forces a state that needs 
to reduce costs to do so in some area other than pension accruals--for example, through 
layoffs or salary reductions. Viewed holistically, the California Rule simply does not 
protect employees' economic interests, and in some cases the rule may even harm the 
interests of the very employees it is meant to protect.
135
 
Monahan may be correct that California law is contrary to general legal principles and 
more protective of employees than federal Contract Clause jurisprudence, but I do not find 
California law “surprising.”  On her first point, there are good reasons to treat statutory promises 
to government employees different from promises contained in other regulatory statutes.  Most 
people have multiple employment options at the outset and at various stages of their careers.  
Retirement promises form part of the inducement for individuals to choose and remain in 
government employment. While businesses may be in a similar situation and may suffer, as did 
the Charles River Bridge Company, when the regulatory rug is pulled out from under it, 
individuals have much less ability to diversify regulatory risk than businesses.  Employees 
cannot be expected to save twice or three times for retirement or change jobs every so often so 
their retirement promises come from multiple employers.  This recognition helps explain why 
federal law protects private pensions through the ERISA and the programs administered by the 
Pension Benefit Guaranty Corp.  That the federal Contracts Clause may be less protective than 
state law is no reason for state law to change.  Under familiar understandings of federalism, in 
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many situations, federal law should be lenient with regard to state law, especially when the 
state’s own operations are involved, stepping in only in extreme cases.  
As to Monahan’s claim that protecting pension promises is inefficient because the 
optimal result may be reduced pension promises rather than layoffs that might be necessary to 
fund remaining employees’ pensions, this is a dilemma that is familiar to anyone studying labor 
economics.  As wages and benefits increase, employers may hire fewer employees, may fire 
existing employees and may replace employees with technology or workers in jurisdictions with 
lower salaries.  Some unions have dealt with this problem by agreeing to lower wages and 
benefits for new employees while protecting the wages and benefits of incumbents.  More 
fundamentally, although Monahan clearly understands that pension promises are a form of 
deferred compensation, her argument in favor of greater flexibility virtually ignores the ex ante 
perspective of the parties.  At the time the contract was made, had the employees’ known that 
their pension promises were subject to significant revision, they may not have accepted 
government employment or they may have demanded significantly higher current compensation.  
Normally, the security of contract enforcement is thought to increase efficiency, and Monahan 
does not refute that general tendency. 
Monahan’s strongest point is that protecting future accrual levels significantly reduces 
pension flexibility.  If she is correct that public employees are “generally at-will employees, with 
no guaranteed period of employment,”136 then it would make legal and practical sense to allow 
prospective changes to the terms of a contract that both parties could simply terminate at any 
time.  At-will employees’ reliance on future benefits may be viewed as unworthy of protection.  
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However, there are reasons to doubt her premise.  Government employees are highly 
unionized,
137
 and are much more likely than private employees to have job security in the form 
of contractual or civil service protections.  Further, advocates of prospective change should 
recognize that, for example, a 20 year government employee suddenly faced with significantly 
lower future accrual of retirement benefits may be seriously damaged economically by the 
change and may not be in a position to seek alternate employment or take some other action to 
ameliorate the effects of the change.
138
 
Sometimes, pension reforms are touted as providing benefits to plan participants even if 
the predominant effect of reform is to reduce pension expenditures.  At a basic level, current and 
future recipients benefit from any reform that brings a fund closer to full funding, because fund 
enhancement makes pension promises more secure.  There are, however, two problems with 
generalizing from this possibility to a principle that any reform that enhances the assets of a 
pension fund survives Contract Clause scrutiny.  First, this reasoning would allow serious 
detriment to some participants as long as most participants gain.  While this might be appropriate 
in some contexts, for example if a reform reduces pension spiking by those at the high end of the 
benefits scale, it would not be appropriate to sacrifice lower end recipients who are heavily 
dependent on their benefits.
139
  The financial health of the fund should not be shored up on the 
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 According to the Cato Institute, “In 2009, 39 percent of state and local workers were members of unions, which 
was more than five times the share in the private sector of 7 percent.”  See Chris D. Edwards, Public-Sector Unions, 
Cato Institute Reports No. 61 (March 2010).  
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 See Eric M. Madiar, Public Pension Benefits under Seige: Does State Law Facilitate or Block Recent Efforts to 
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backs of those who can least afford it.  Second, using the financial health of pension funds as a 
justification for reforms that otherwise harm plan participants is illogical if the pension promises 
involved are viewed as contractual obligations in favor of recipients.  Recipients gain nothing if 
under state law the plan must live up to the promises made regardless of the financial health of 
whatever fund has been established to marshal assets to make the payments.  Reform under such 
circumstances benefits only the state budget, not pension plan participants.
140
 
The final issue in a Contract Clause controversy examines the government interest 
advanced by the challenged reforms.  Although the Contract Clause is phrased as an absolute 
prohibition on state laws impairing contracts, as noted, courts apply what appears to be akin to an 
intermediate level of constitutional scrutiny in Contract Clause cases, asking whether the 
challenged government acts are “reasonable and necessary to serve an important public 
purpose.”141  In the pension area, this standard may save reforms that are designed to combat 
abusive pension practices.
142
  The question remains, however, whether a pure desire to save 
                                                                                                                                                             
small pensions are highly dependent on those benefits because they worked at relatively low paying government 
jobs for long periods and did not participate in federal Social Security during that time.  It is thus difficult to design 
reforms based purely on the size of the pension. 
140
 I leave to the side for now the possibility of bankruptcy, which might allow greater reductions. See infra at x. 
141
 Parker v. Wakelin, 123 F.3d 1, 5 (1st Cir. 1997) (quoting U.S. Trust Co. of New York v. New Jersey, 431 U.S. 1, 
25 (1977)); see also Energy Reserves Group, Inc. v. Kansas Power & Light Co., 459 U.S. 400, 411-12 (1983).  Cf. 
Craig v. Boren, 429 U.S. 190, 197 (1976) (“classifications by gender must serve important governmental objectives 
and must be substantially related to achievement of those objectives.”). 
142
 Courts seem open to reforms that curb abusive pension practices.  For example, in Madden v. Contributory Ret. 
Appeal Bd., 431 Mass. 697 (2000), the Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court approved a decision by the Teachers’ 
Retirement Board to close a loophole that would have allowed a part-time teacher to receive full-time credit for part-
time service.  However, the court disapproved of application of the new rule to part-time service before the rule was 
adopted.  The Court stated that modifications in benefits are allowed if they are “reasonable and bear some material 
relationship to the theory of a pension system and its successful operation.”  Id. at 701.  
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money is sufficient to save a reform measure that operates only to reduce payments to retirees, 
increase contributions from retirees, or both.
143
 
In general, it appears that courts rarely approve substantial impairments as supported by a 
sufficient government interest.
144
  In support of pension reform, it might simply be argued that 
saving money is an important public purpose and thus, especially if obligations to retirees pose a 
fiscal crisis as some claim, reducing pension obligations is “reasonably necessary” to serve that 
interest.  The problem is that this could be said about virtually any breach of contract by 
government—the government has decided that it would be better off not living up to its promises 
because, at a minimum, it saves resources.  As the Supreme Court stated in a Contract Clause 
case not involving public pensions: 
Merely because the governmental actor believes that money can be better spent or 
should now be conserved does not provide a sufficient interest to impair the obligation of 
contract. If a State could reduce its financial obligations whenever it wanted to spend the 
money for what it regarded as an important public purpose, the Contract Clause would 
provide no protection at all.
145
 
There should therefore be some additional government interest behind pension reform.  Such an 
interest might be in eliminating fraud or abusive pension practices that detract from equity 
among workers and result in unjustifiable benefits, i.e., benefits with no relation to the retirement 
income that the employee was relying on as part of government service.   
                                                 
143
 For an argument that budget difficulties and financial downturns should provide adequate reasons to allow states 
to modify their pension obligations, see Whitney Cloud, Comment, State Pension Deficits, the Recession, and a 
Modern View of the Contracts Clause, 120 YALE L.J. 2199 (2011).  See also Gavin Reinke, Note, When a Promise 
Isn’t A Promise: Public Employers’ Ability to Alter Pension Plans of Retired Employees, 64 Vand. L. Rev. 1673, 
1989-90 (2011) (arguing that saving money is legitimate government interest supporting pension reform against 
substantive due process challenge). 
144
 Monahan, supra note x, at 631  (“The only public pension plan cases identified that found substantial 
impairments to be reasonable and necessary to serve an important public purpose were in cases where the court first 
held that no substantial impairment occurred.”). 
145
 U.S. Trust Co. of New York, 431 U.S. at 26. 
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It is unclear whether the government interest in saving money on pension expenses would 
be more acceptable if it were linked to a history of overly generous promises and abusive 
practices.  The government should be viewed as having an interest in closing loopholes that 
allow abusive practices.  In general, government has an interest in protecting the integrity and 
fairness of programs it administers.   Courts should be more receptive to reforms that target 
practices that are regarded as abusive than to reforms that reduce benefits to employees who 
legitimately relied on them. 
The propriety of considering the government’s interest in saving money as the interest 
behind pension reform is also linked to the structure of the pension plan and state law on whether 
pension promises are strictly enforceable. If plan participants are legally entitled under state law 
to their promised payments regardless of whether the state has set aside sufficient funds to meet 
its obligations, it would seem that the simple interest in saving money should not be sufficient to 
support pension reform.  Under such circumstances, to allow government’s interest in saving 
money to support reducing benefits would essentially nullify the plan participants’ legal rights 
without any compensatory benefit. 
B. The Takings Clause and Pension Reform 
Another possible constitutional constraint on pension reform is the Takings Clause, 
which prohibits government from taking property for public use without compensation.  In 
litigation involving public pensions, it is common for claims under the Contract Clause and 
Takings Clause to be made together over the same reform, because under current understandings, 
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government contractual promises may be considered property for constitutional purposes.
146
  
With regard to state and local reforms, the Takings Clause is unlikely to add much to claims 
under the Contract Clause because a participant’s interest in pension promises is unlikely to be 
property unless it is found to be a contractual promise protected under the Contract Clause or 
state law pension doctrine.
147
  It is theoretically possible, however, that a reform that does not 
violate the Contract Clause, because the government’s action is reasonable and necessary to 
serve an important public purpose, violates the Takings Clause.  This is because the 
government’s justification for a taking is irrelevant—if it takes property even for the most 
important of purposes, it must pay compensation. 
The takings claim is strongest with regard to benefits that have already been paid, and 
might also be relatively strong with regard to reforms that reduce pension payments to people 
already receiving them.  In the Scigulinsky case, involving “evictions” of participants from a 
state pension plan, the First Circuit upheld legislation that halted public pension payments to 
private union employees.  The legislation required the state to repay, with interest, these 
participants’ contributions to the system insofar as they exceeded what the participants had 
received in payments.  The court noted that “[p]ension payments actually made to retirees 
become their property and are protected against takings, even if and where the payments are 
                                                 
146
 See, e.g., San Diego Police Officers' Ass'n v. San Diego City Employees' Ret. Sys., 568 F.3d 725 (9
th
 Cir. 2009) 
(plaintiffs allege that failure to fund pension plan adequately violated both the Contracts Clause and Takings 
Clause). 
147
 Picard v. Members of Emp. Ret. Bd. of Providence, 275 F.3d 139, 144 (1
st
 Cir. 2001) (“In evaluating whether a 
purported contract or property right is entitled to constitutional protection under the Takings Clause, Contract 
Clause, or Due Process Clause, this Court generally looks to state law as interpreted by the state's highest court.”); 
Nat'l Educ. Ass'n-Rhode Island ex rel. Scigulinsky v. Ret. Bd. of Rhode Island Employees' Ret. Sys., 172 F.3d 22 
(1
st
 Cir. 1999) (“It would make nonsense of such rulings-and the clear intent requirement-to conclude that an 
expectancy insufficient to constitute an enforceable contract against the state could simply be renamed “property” 
and enforced as a promise through the back door under the Takings Clause.”). 
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unquestionably a gift.”148  The law is less clear with regard to promises made to people who have 
already retired.  Some courts view such benefits as vested and immune from reduction.  .  Other 
courts view such benefits as regulatory promises that are open to change, assuming state law 
does not clearly immunize them from revision.  The same can be said of benefit promises to 
people eligible to retire at the time reforms are enacted.  Some courts treat these as vested and 
immutable, but again, this depends largely on the terms of state law.  Because of this connection 
to state law, the Takings Clause is likely to follow the Contract Clause in recognizing only those 
claims that involve unmistakeable contractual promises already protected from reduction under 
state law. 
The possibility that a pension reform measure that satisfies Contract Clause scrutiny but 
nevertheless might require compensation under the Takings Clause implicates the thorny issue of 
the extent to which regulation under the state’s police power that reduces the value of property 
can constitute a taking of that property requiring compensation.  If each dollar of promised 
pension benefits is viewed as a separate property interest, then it would seem that any diminution 
would violate the Takings Clause.  But if instead the property interest is viewed as the value of 
the pension as a whole, then reforms that preserve the bulk of expected benefits should not be 
problematic.  In this article, I will not attempt to resolve the conceptual difficulties that plague 
regulatory takings doctrine.
149
  It should be noted, however, that the application of regulatory 
takings analysis is highly uncertain in the public pension context because the property rights at 
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 Scigulinsky, 172 F.3d at 30. 
149
 Regulatory takings doctrine has proven very lenient in terms of allowing changes in government regulation to 
cause substantial reductions in the value of private property without requiring compensation.  However, the law is 
very strict when government requires the actual physical occupation of private property.  It is difficult to fit 
reduction in pension benefits into this paradigm. On the one hand, if each dollar of expected benefits is considered a 
separate piece of property, then taking one away might be considered a taking.  On the other hand, if the property 
interest is in a reasonable pension in light of work performed, then reforms may not appear to be prohibited takings. 
Beermann, Public Pension Crisis, 9/23/2012 
 
61 
 
issue are contractual and perhaps even regulatory, which makes it difficult to separate the terms 
of state law from the value of the property allegedly taken. 
The reasons for the relative leniency of regulatory takings law apply in the context of 
pension reform. Regulatory takings law recognizes that adapting government policy to changed 
circumstances or new priorities would be impossible if every regulatory diminution in the value 
of a property interest requires compensation.  Flexibility is even more important if it appears that 
pension promises are overly generous, subject to abuse by legislators and other officials handing 
out political favors and by employees using loopholes and tricks to spike their pensions.  It is one 
thing for the government to breach a simple arms-length contract with a supplier of goods or 
services.  It is quite another for government to attempt to reign in excessive pension promises 
made to secure the power of incumbent politicians at the expense of taxpayers.  Just as the law 
does not generally recognize a reliance interest in a static regulatory environment, so too is it 
unlikely to recognize a reliance interest in a completely static public pension system.  To the 
extent that courts apply the Takings Clause to pension reform, they are unlikely to rule against 
reforms except in the most extreme circumstances. 
As noted, takings analysis is likely to mirror the analysis undertaken pursuant to state law 
pension protections and the Contract Clause.  The Takings Clause may have independent bite in 
one potentially significant situation, i.e., when pension reform is undertaken pursuant to federal 
law, either because changes are being made to federal government pensions or because state 
pensions are adjusted pursuant to federal law, most notably federal bankruptcy law.  The 
Contract Clause does not apply to the federal government and therefore federal changes to 
existing contractual relationships are scrutinized under the more lenient minimal scrutiny applied 
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to substantive due process challenges to economic regulation.
150
  If federal law allows or even 
requires the reduction of pension benefits to federal or state and local employees, the Takings 
Clause might be the most promising avenue for attacking the reform.  In the current context, a 
key issue is whether a municipality can use federal bankruptcy law to discharge its pension 
obligations.  As discussed below, the answer appears to be yes, and because the Contracts Clause 
does not apply to the federal government, the principal legal question becomes whether a 
discharge pursuant to bankruptcy law could be viewed as an uncompensated taking.  This is 
discussed below.
151
 
IV. Bankruptcy, Reduction of Pension Obligations, and Default
152
 
Chapter 9 of the Bankruptcy Code allows for the “adjustment of debts of a municipality.”  
In short, local government units can declare bankruptcy and have their debts adjusted under 
federal law.  Municipalities may not employ federal bankruptcy law if the law of their state does 
not allow it.
153
  In other words, local governments need state permission to declare bankruptcy.  
In theory, in states in which municipal bankruptcy is allowed, federal bankruptcy law could be 
employed by municipal governments to reduce or eliminate their pension obligations.
154
 
                                                 
150
 See Pension Ben. Guar. Corp. v. R.A. Gray & Co., 467 U.S. 717, 730 (1984) (“The retroactive aspects of 
legislation, as well as the prospective aspects, must meet the test of due process[.]  [T]hat burden is met simply by 
showing that the retroactive application of the legislation is itself justified by a rational legislative purpose.”) 
151
 See infra at x (concluding that takings principles are unlikely to prevent state and local governments from 
pursuing pension reform through bankruptcy or otherwise). 
152
 I am indebted to Ted Orson, lawyer for the City of Central Falls, Rhode Island and the State of Rhode Island in 
the city’s municipal bankruptcy proceedings for guiding me through Chapter 9 of the Bankruptcy Code and offering 
his perspective on the subject.  For a theoretical overview of municipal bankruptcy, see Michael W. McConnell & 
Randall C. Picker, When Cities Go Broke: A Conceptual Introduction to Municipal Bankruptcy, 60 U. Chi. L. Rev. 
425 (1993). 
153
 11 U.S.C. § 109(c). 
154
 The funded portion of future pension benefits might not be subject to adjustment in bankruptcy, but unfunded 
obligations might be subject to “discharge at less than full payment.”  Skeel, supra note x, at 692. 
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There are significant differences between municipal bankruptcy and bankruptcy of 
private entities.  Most significantly, there is no provision for liquidation of municipal assets and 
termination of the existence of the municipality.  It is thought that federal liquidation of a 
municipal government would be too great an intrusion into state authority.
155
  Further, 
bankruptcy may not be used to restructure the municipal government because that too would 
interfere with state authority over municipalities.
156
  Finally, there is no provision in federal law 
for states themselves to declare bankruptcy, and any such effort would be met with serious 
constitutional objections. 
There are five statutory conditions
157
 that must be met for municipalities to use Chapter 9 
to adjust their finances.  First, the municipality must be authorized under state law to be a debtor 
under Chapter 9.
158
  Second, the debtor must actually be a municipality.  For villages, cities, 
towns, counties and such, this is normally not a difficult condition to meet, but status as a 
municipality may be less clear for other government entities, such as water districts, school 
districts, and other special purpose agencies.  Third, the debtor must be insolvent.  “Insolvent” is 
defined in the Bankruptcy Code to mean either failing to pay debts or “unable to pay its debts as 
they become due.”159  In the case law, this is interpreted to mean not only that the municipality is 
running a deficit but also that it will be unable to pay its debts in the current or next fiscal 
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 The official website of the United States Courts describing municipal bankruptcy provisions makes this point.  
See Municipality Bankruptcy, USCOURTS.GOV,  
http://www.uscourts.gov/federalcourts/bankruptcy/bankruptcybasics/Chapter9.aspx. 
156
 11 U.S.C. §§ 903 & 904. 
157
 These requirements are contained in § 109(c). 
158
 The Allegheny Institute reports that as of 2010, nineteen states authorized their municipalities to employ federal 
bankruptcy.  See Allegheny Institute, Issue Summary: Municipal Bankruptcy, 
http://www.alleghenyinstitute.org/government/munbankruptcy.html. 
159
 11 U.S.C. § 101(32). 
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year.
160
 Fourth, the municipality must desire to make a plan to reorganize its debts.  This 
precludes involuntary municipal bankruptcy.  Fifth, the municipality must either obtain 
agreement from creditors holding a majority of claims, negotiate in good faith with creditors, 
show that negotiation would be impracticable, or reasonably believe that a creditor will obtain a 
preference absent bankruptcy.   Usually, this fifth requirement results in negotiations with 
creditors before the municipality files. 
Municipal bankruptcy allows for adjustment of pension liabilities to both retired workers 
and current workers who are paying into the retirement system.  For current workers, their labor 
contracts are considered executory contracts under § 365 of the Bankruptcy Code, which is 
explicitly applicable to municipal bankruptcy.
 161
  Debtors are authorized by § 365 to reject their 
executory contracts.  Thus, in the bankruptcy of Central Falls, Rhode Island, on the day the 
petition was filed, the city rejected all of the collective bargaining agreements and imposed new 
terms of employment, including new provisions relating to pensions.
162
  Due to the special nature 
of collective bargaining agreements, rejection of municipal collective bargaining agreements is 
allowed only if the “balance of equities” favors rejection. 163  If this standard is met, 
                                                 
160
 See In re City of Bridgeport 132 B.R. 85, 89 (Bankr. D. Conn. 1991).  Apparently, a high percentage of 
municipal filings are rejected, as the City of Bridgeport’s was, because the municipality is not legally insolvent. 
161
 See 11 U.S.C. § 901 (incorporating 11 U.S.C. § 365 into Chapter 9 on Municipal Bankruptcy). 
162
 Unless otherwise noted, all information concerning the Central Falls, Rhode Island, bankruptcy is drawn from a 
conversation with Ted Orson, bankruptcy attorney for the City and State of Rhode Island and from the Chapter 9 
plan for the City filed with the Bankruptcy Court, available at 
http://www.rib.uscourts.gov/newhome/central_falls/CF479.asp. 
163
 It should be noted that after the Supreme Court decided that it was not an unfair labor practice for a debtor to 
reject a collective bargaining agreement in N.L.R.B. v. Bildisco & Bildisco, 465 U.S. 513 (1984), Congress enacted 
special provisions regarding rejection of collective bargaining agreements.  Bankruptcy Amendments and Federal 
Judgeship Act of 1984, Pub. L. No. 98-353, 98 Stat. 333-92 (1984) (codified at 11 U.S.C. § 1113).  Those provisions 
are not among those listed by Congress as applying to municipal bankruptcy, which means that rejection of 
municipal collective bargaining agreements is governed by Bildisco’s “balance of equities” standard, which the 
Supreme Court determined was the most accurate reading of Congress’s intent regarding the application of § 365 to 
collective bargaining agreements.   Another difference between rejection under § 365 and rejection under § 1113 is 
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municipalities can reduce or eliminate pension and health care promises to current workers, and 
require them to contribute more toward the costs of both. 
With regard to retired municipal workers already receiving pension benefits, the situation 
is simpler as a legal matter but more complicated as an equitable or political matter.  Because 
retired employees have no substantial remaining contractual obligations to the municipality, their 
pension promises are no longer considered executory contracts.
164
  Rather, under bankruptcy 
law, the obligation to make future pension and health care payments to retired workers is a 
simple debt of the debtor, and the creditors (retired workers) have only unsecured claims against 
the municipality.  The claims are unsecured because workers do not have separate individual 
accounts into which their retirement contributions (and the employer’s matching contributions) 
have been deposited.  In fact, for municipalities with severe underfunding, benefits are often paid 
out of the contributions of current employees, and there is no segregation of the funds 
contributed by each worker and by the municipality itself on behalf of each worker.   
This means that theoretically, retired workers could see their benefits subjected to severe 
restrictions.  Given that many municipal workers have not participated in the federal Social 
Security system, this could cause serious hardship, basically placing retirees without other 
                                                                                                                                                             
that when a contract is rejected under § 365, the creditor has a claim for damages as an unsecured creditor for breach 
of contract.  By contrast, the dominant view is that when rejection is accomplished under § 1113, the affected 
employees have no claim for damages because their rights have already been determined under federal bankruptcy 
law.  For a discussion of the constitutionality of state and local rejection of collective bargaining agreements, see 
Ronald D. Wenkert, Unilateral Modification of Collective Bargaining Agreements in Times of Fiscal Crisis and 
Bankruptcy: An Unconstitutional Impairment of Contract?, 225 ED. L. REP. 1 (2007). 
164
 The authoritative definition of “executory contract” in bankruptcy law was formulated by Vern Countryman in 
his article Executory Contracts in Bankruptcy: Part I, 57 MINN. L. REV. 439, 460 (1973).  See also See Comment, 
Hannah Heck, Solving Insolvent Public Pensions: The Limitations of the Current Bankruptcy Option, 8 Emory 
Bankr. Dev. J. 89, 124 (2011)  (concluding that pension obligations to retired workers are not executory contracts 
because retirees have no continuing contractual obligations).  This comment also argues that any state law 
impediments to implementation of federal bankruptcy law in the public pension context (other than state refusal to 
allow its municipalities to use Chapter 9) would be preempted by federal law.  See id. at 120-21. 
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savings into abject poverty.  There have been so few municipal bankruptcies and even fewer in 
which pensions to current retirees are adjusted that there is no real precedent for how retirees 
ought to be treated.  The proposed plan in the Central Falls, Rhode Island, bankruptcy, which 
cited pension and health care obligations to retirees as a major cause of insolvency,
 165
   would 
reduce most retirees’ pension benefits by 55 percent, except that no retiree’s pension would be 
reduced below $10,000 per year.
166
  While these cuts may seem draconian, the plan treated 
retirees better than other unsecured creditors.  Apparently, there was a strong feeling among 
those involved in the bankruptcy that it would have been inhumane to reduce retirees’ benefits to 
the level they would get as unsecured creditors. 
To some, it may still seem cruel to reduce pensions so much.  Many of Central Falls’ 
employees worked for the city for decades, always expecting that their pensions would be paid 
based on the formula established in their employment contracts.  They relied on those funds in 
making important life choices such as whether to continue their city employment, whether to 
save or spend their salaries, whether to move, and whether to go back to school to train for a 
different profession.  As discussed above, most pensions are not unreasonable when viewed in 
light of the employees’ total compensation packages.  A worker retiring at a $50,000 salary may 
see a $35,000 pension reduced to under $16,000, and may have increased health care costs.  This 
is a serious hardship to the people involved and may be life changing for many of them.  
However, this is the pain caused in many situations of insolvency.  Just as Bernard Madoff’s 
clients were led to believe that their investments were worth much more than was true, the City 
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 See Mary Williams & Katie Zezima, Small City, Big Debt Problems, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 1, 2011. 
166
 See Plan for the Adjustment of Debts of City of Central Falls, Rhode Island, In re City of Cent. Falls, R.I., 468 
B.R. 36 (Bankr. D.R.I. 2012) (No. 11-13105), available at 
http://www.rib.uscourts.gov/newhome/central_falls/116/116-1.pdf. 
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of Central Falls misled its employees.  Apparently the City failed for years to make its actuarially 
required contributions on behalf of its employees.  The money to pay retirees’ pensions in full 
was simply not there.  The question is whether the City or the State should be required to 
increase taxes or employ some other financial device to make good on these promises. 
Given the lack of precedent, it remains to be seen whether other unsecured creditors will 
challenge favorable treatment to retirees in municipal bankruptcy as unfair to them, perhaps 
arguing that they will receive lower payouts on their claims as a result of the favorable treatment 
of pension claims.  It also remains to be seen how federal bankruptcy courts will react to such 
claims.  Congress could amend the Bankruptcy Code to deal with the problem, but federalism 
concerns counsel against it.  Congress may not want to interfere with the local political 
considerations that are likely to affect the treatment of retirees in municipal bankruptcy.  Some 
states have enacted legislation allowing state authorities to assume supervision over distressed 
municipalities.  More specifically, in Central Falls, the retirees negotiated for a five year 
transition period during which their pension benefits would be reduced by only 25 percent.  This 
was contingent on the state legislature providing funding during the transition period, which it 
did.  Federal standards on the treatment of government retirees in bankruptcy might interfere 
with these local political efforts. 
The Contract Clause of the federal Constitution is no bar to municipal bankruptcy for the 
simple reason that the Contract Clause does not apply to the federal government.
167
  While the 
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 Federal laws affecting the obligation of contracts are evaluated under a less exacting due process standard.  See 
Pension Ben. Guar. Corp. v. R.A. Gray & Co., 467 U.S. 717, 733 (1984) (“to the extent that recent decisions of the 
Court have addressed the issue, we have contrasted the limitations imposed on States by the Contract Clause with 
the less searching standards imposed on economic legislation by the Due Process Clauses.”). 
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first municipal bankruptcy law was found to violate the Contract Clause by allowing 
municipalities to violate their contracts,
168
 this does not appear to be the current understanding.  
Later, the constitutionality of federal bankruptcy for municipal governments was upheld against 
challenges based on federal interference with state sovereignty and due process,
169
 and it does 
not seem that a challenge based on the contractual or property rights of municipal creditors 
would succeed either.
170
  Instead of relatively stringent Contract Clause scrutiny, federal 
interference with the obligation of contracts is judged under the deferential rational basis 
standard applied to economic regulation generally.
171
   
Even in these difficult financial times, municipal bankruptcy has been very rare.  Further, 
even if municipal bankruptcy became more common, it would have no effect on the large portion 
of unfunded retirement obligations owed by states to their current and retired workers.  As noted, 
there is no provision for state governments to file for bankruptcy under federal law.
172
  There is a 
question of whether it would be constitutional to amend federal law to allow states to file for 
adjustment of their finances in the same fashion as municipal governments.  Professor Skeel 
notes that advocates of state bankruptcy do not find the constitutional objection to be serious if 
two conditions that already apply to municipal bankruptcy are met—filing must be voluntary, 
and bankruptcy must not interfere with governmental decision making.
173
  He also notes that 
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 Ashton v. Cameron County Water Imp. Dist. No. 1, 298 U.S. 513, 531 (1936).  See also Skeel, supra note x, at 
708. 
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 United States v. Bekins, 304 U.S. 27 (1938). 
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 See id. at 54. 
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 Pension Ben. Guar, Corp., 467 U.S. at 728-31. 
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 For a discussion of the possibility of authorizing states to employ bankruptcy to restructure their debts, see Skeel, 
supra note x. 
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 See id. at 679. 
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these advocates view the constitutional permissibility of municipal bankruptcy as strong 
precedent for the constitutionality of state bankruptcy.  
It is not absolutely clear that the approval of municipal bankruptcy is precedent for 
finding no constitutional difficulty with state bankruptcy.  The status of municipal governments 
under federal law is inconsistent to say the least.  Long ago, in refusing to intervene in a dispute 
concerning municipal boundaries and responsibility for municipal debts,
174
 the Supreme Court 
stated as a basic principle that municipal governments exercise state governmental power and are 
created and organized purely for the convenience of the states.  “Municipal corporations are 
political subdivisions of the state, created as convenient agencies for exercising such of the 
governmental powers of the state as may be entrusted to them.”175  In this light, if municipalities 
are simply state agencies, then the constitutionality of municipal bankruptcy should provide a 
strong precedent for the constitutionality of state bankruptcy. 
There are, however, many ways in which municipal governments and state governments 
are treated differently under federal law.  In the civil rights area, state governments, including 
state agencies, are immune from damages by virtue of the Eleventh Amendment and principles 
of sovereign immunity, while municipal governments are not.  States are not “persons” subject to 
federal civil rights liability in state courts while municipal governments are.  Given that the 
Contract Clause is directed explicitly at states –“No State shall . . . pass any  . . .  Law impairing 
the Obligation of Contracts”—perhaps state attempts to reduce their contractually binding 
pension obligations should be treated differently than similar actions by municipal governments. 
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 Id. at 178. 
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The fact that municipalities are subject to state control may provide a basis for treating 
state and municipal governments differently with regard to the possibility of using bankruptcy 
law to adjust their debts.  Unlike other debtors, states theoretically have the ability to raise 
whatever funds are necessary to pay their debts through taxation.  Municipal governments may 
not have this ability because they are subject to state control.  The state legislature could prevent 
a locality from raising sufficient funds to pay their debts by forbidding increased taxation or 
limiting revenue sources.  Further, a geographically small municipal government is much more 
likely to run up against practical limits on its taxing ability than a large municipality or a state.   
States, by contrast, lack funds only when the state’s own government declines to raise 
them through sufficient taxes and fees.  Lack of taxable wealth may limit the ability of states to 
raise revenue, but this is much more likely to be a local problem than a statewide problem.  As a 
conceptual matter, unless taxation is at such a high level that there is simply no more wealth to 
tax, from the point of view of a creditor, state bankruptcy looks more like a political decision not 
to pay debts than a true state of insolvency.
176
  However, this picture is somewhat incomplete.  
While it is true that state taxpayers in a state with underfunded pension liabilities are able to push 
off some of the costs of state services onto future taxpayers, it is difficult to blame those future 
taxpayers for resisting tax increases to pay for pension liabilities incurred in the past when they 
may not have been enjoying the benefits of the services provided in exchange for the unfunded 
pension promises.  Similarly, it is not difficult to imagine that future federal taxpayers would 
                                                 
176
 Tax increases sufficient to meet all unfunded pension obligations may be economically disastrous and state 
taxpayers as a whole would be better off if states were allowed to reduce their obligations rather than raise taxes.  
High taxes can put a damper on economic activity and encourage business to move to lower tax states or countries.  
However, state bankruptcy to avoid pension obligations would exacerbate the unwillingness of state politicians to 
raise sufficient funds for pension obligations, which either results in hardship for workers relying on their pensions 
or imposes the cost of current labor on future generations of taxpayers. 
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resist tax increases to pay the $16 trillion in debt that the federal government has incurred in the 
last 12 years or so. 
If bankruptcy is not available to states, does that mean that they are stuck with their 
pension and health care obligations to retired workers?  Theoretically, the answer seems to be 
yes, as perhaps it ought to be given the interests of state retirees and employees.  Default on 
pension obligations, or alterations beyond those allowed under Contract Clause jurisprudence, 
would violate the federal constitution and would also be contrary to the law in many, if not all, 
states.  However, just because state action violates federal law does not guarantee an effective 
remedy.  Surprisingly, whether states can be sued in federal court over alleged constitutional 
violations in pension reform is unclear. 
Controversy over federal remedies for state contractual violations goes back to the 
beginnings of the republic.  When the state of Georgia defaulted on its bonds after the 
Revolutionary War and the Supreme Court ruled in Chisolm v. Georgia
177
 that Georgia could be 
sued in federal court by a nonresident for breach of contract, the state legislature considered and 
nearly passed a statute imposing the death penalty, “without benefit of clergy,” on anyone 
attempting to enforce the judgment in the case.
178
  The decision also provoked Congress and the 
states to pass and ratify the Eleventh Amendment to the Constitution,
179
 which reversed the 
jurisdictional ruling in the Chisolm case.  One hundred years later, the Supreme Court ruled that 
the Eleventh Amendment and principles of sovereign immunity precluded federal court 
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 Chisolm v. Georgia, 2 U.S. 419 (1793) 
178
 See William A. Fletcher, A Historical Interpretation of the Eleventh Amendment: A Narrow  
Construction of an Affirmative Grant of Jurisdiction Rather Than a Prohibition against Jurisdiction, 35 Stan. L. Rev. 
1033, 1058 (1983). 
179
 U.S. Const. Amend. XI. 
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jurisdiction over a claim brought by a citizen of Louisiana alleging that the state violated the U.S. 
Constitution by defaulting on bonds issued in 1874.
180
   
Thus, it appears that the federal cases establish that states cannot be sued for damages in 
federal court without their consent, even for actions that violate the Constitution of the United 
States.
181
  However, under well-established principles, when state law violates the federal 
constitution, state officials can be sued in their official capacities for injunctive relief,
182
 even if 
the injunction requires future payments from the state treasury.
183
  This means that a state official 
could be ordered, on pain of contempt, to make future payments found to be constitutionally 
required, but the official could probably not be ordered to make past payments wrongfully 
withheld.
184
  Thus, the conventional understanding seems to be that if state pension reform is 
found to violate the federal constitution, injunctive relief may be available in federal court to 
                                                 
180
 Hans v. Louisiana, 134 U.S. 1 (1890). 
181
 It appears to be an open question whether states can avoid their Takings Clause obligation to pay compensation 
for takings of private property by interposing a sovereign immunity defense.  A decision by the Supreme Court 
recognizing sovereign immunity from takings claims would be shocking.  The Takings Clause appears to be a limit 
on sovereignty of both the federal government and state governments now that the Takings Clause applies to them 
under the Fourteenth Amendment.  Perhaps Contracts Clause claims against states for breaching their own contracts 
should be thought of the same way.  This depends, however, on the expansion of the Contract Clause to cover the 
state’s own contracts, and state immunity from contract damages is not directly contrary to clear constitutional text 
the way that immunity from takings claims would be (again assuming the Takings Clause applies to the states 
through the Fourteenth Amendment). 
182
 Ex Parte Young, 209 U.S. 123 (1908).  The reach of Ex Parte Young is not completely clear.  Other decisions 
from the same era seem to validate sovereign immunity in federal court from contract damages and from suits 
seeking specific performance of contracts between a state and private parties.  See Louisiana v. Jumel, 107 U.S. 711 
(1883); In re Ayers, 123 U.S. 443 (1887); Hagood v. Southern, 117 U.S. 52 (1886).  Hagood was distinguished in 
Ex Parte Young as a case in which the state was the actual party in interest, which seems to be the case with regard 
to pension reform as well.  See Ex Parte Young, 209 U.S. at 150., 
183
 See Edelman v. Jordan, 415 U.S. 651 (1974).  See also Milliken v. Bradley, 433 U.S. 267 (1977). 
184
 See Quern v. Jordan, 440 U.S. 332 (1979).  Professor Skeel posits that “the officer could evade a mandamus 
action seeking to compel performance of the contract by simply resigning.” Skeel, supra note x, at 686, but normally 
when the case is brought in the officer’s official capacity, the new occupant of the resigned official’s office is 
substituted, and the case continues without regard to the resignation of the officer.  For example, Quern became the 
defendant in Edelman v. Jordan when he took Edelman’s position in the state of Illinois.  No doubt, state and local 
officials may sometimes succeed in avoiding liability, but it is not likely to be so simple as resigning once the 
official is ordered to comply with federal law in the future. 
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require responsible officials to make future payments and administer the program based on 
preexisting standards, but they could not be ordered to make up for past reductions in payments 
or other past violations.
185
 
This conventional understanding of the line between permissible and impermissible 
federal relief against state officials is more complicated than it seems, because it is not entirely 
clear that injunctions requiring increases in future payments to meet constitutional obligations 
are allowed.  Consider, for example, a recent decision by a federal district court in New Jersey 
holding that an attack on pension reforms in New Jersey is barred by the Eleventh 
Amendment.
186
  The State of New Jersey passed legislation increasing employees’ required 
contributions to state pension funds and suspending cost of living allowances for both current 
and future retirees.
187
  The plaintiffs challenged these reforms as impairing the obligation of 
contracts, taking property without just compensation and as violating their due process rights.  
The court, in a thoughtful opinion, found federal jurisdiction barred because rather than 
challenging an ongoing violation of federal law, the plaintiffs were seeking a remedy for a past 
violation, namely the passage of the pension reform statute at issue.
188
  Under this reasoning, 
                                                 
185
 For an overview of the ways in which judicial decisions constrain state fiscal decisionmaking, see Kenneth T. 
Cuccinelli, II, E. Duncan Getchell, Jr., & Wesley G. Russell, Jr., Judicial Compulsion and the Public Fisc—A 
Historical Overview, 35 Harv. J.L. & Pub. Pol'y 525 (2012). 
186
 See New Jersey Education Assoc, v. New Jersey, 2012 WL 715284 (D.N.J.). 
187
 Id. at *1. 
188
   The court structured the inquiry as follows: “[T]he question to be answered in this case is appropriately framed 
as determining whether Plaintiffs' requested relief is retroactive or prospective in nature.  Therefore, at the heart of 
this Court's Eleventh Amendment analysis is the following question: was the enactment of Chapter 78 a single act 
that has continuing ill-effects or does the enforcement of Chapter 78 by the Executive Defendants amount to a 
continuous violation of the Plaintiffs' constitutional rights?  . . . After examining the nature of Plaintiffs' claims, the 
Court has determined that the enactment of Chapter 78 was a single act that continues to have negative 
consequences for the Plaintiffs. As such, any redress sought by the Plaintiffs would be retroactive in nature and is 
therefore barred by the Eleventh Amendment.”  Id. at *4. 
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there is no federal remedy for a states’ breach of contract even if the breach violates the 
Contracts Clause.
189
 
The final substantive issue to be addressed is whether the Takings Clause provides 
protection against diminution of government pension obligations pursuant to bankruptcy, on the 
theory that pensions are property that may not be taken without just compensation.  Takings 
analysis turns out not to be a promising avenue of attack for public pension plan participants 
seeking to avoid costly reform.  In short, although the Supreme Court has made it clear that 
takings principles apply to bankruptcy’s effects on property, 190 the Takings Clause is unlikely to 
provide protection for public pension recipients and government employees with accrued service 
toward pensions because bankruptcy and other reform does not deprive the pension plan 
participants of an interest in identifiable property. 
Takings principles limit the ability of bankruptcy to destroy creditors’ property interests 
including liens and security interests that creditors often hold in debtors’ property.191  It does not 
                                                 
189
 See id. at * 5, citing Va. Office of Prot. & Advocacy v. Stewart, 131 S. Ct. 1632, 1639 (2011) (“Therefore, the 
relief requested by Plaintiffs is, in both substance and practical effect, a request for specific performance of the 
alleged pre-Chapter 78 contract existing between Plaintiffs and the State of New Jersey. Under controlling Supreme 
Court precedent, such relief is not permitted.”) 
190
 “The bankruptcy power is subject to the Fifth Amendment's prohibition against taking private property without 
compensation.” United States v. Security Indus. Bank, 459 U.S. 70, 75, (1982).    On the relationship between 
bankruptcy and takings principles, see James S. Rogers, The Impairment of Secured Creditors' Rights in 
Reorganization: A Study of the Relationship Between the Fifth Amendment and the Bankruptcy Clause, 96 Harv. L. 
Rev. 973 (1983). 
191
 See Security Indus. Bank, 459 U.S. at 78 (construing Bankruptcy Code not to authorize destruction of liens to 
avoid constitutional question whether destruction would be a taking requiring compensation.)  The interaction 
between bankruptcy law and takings principles became an issue during the Great Depression when Congress enacted 
statutes providing for relief of bankrupt homeowners against mortgage foreclosure.  See also Louisville Joint Stock 
Land Bank v. Radford, 295 U.S. 555, 590 (1935) (finding bankruptcy law unconstitutional insofar as it authorized 
“the taking of substantive rights in specific property acquired by the” creditor, namely a mortgage held by a bank).  
But see Wright v. Vinton Branch of Mountain Trust Bank, 300 U.S. 440 (1937) (upholding amended provisions 
preserving mortgagees’ interest while imposing a stay on foreclosure proceedings subject to the discretion of the 
federal court).  For a more recent affirmation of the constitutionality of adjusting mortgagees’ rights in bankruptcy, 
see Travelers Ins. Co. v. Bullington, 878 F.2d 354 (11th Cir. 1989).   
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protect purely contractual rights such as the details of pension promises made by governmental 
units to past and current employees.  The whole point of bankruptcy is to adjust such unsecured 
obligations among the creditors so that no creditor or class of creditor gains an unfair share of the 
debtor’s assets.192  The analysis might be different if employees’ and retirees’ funds were held in 
segregated accounts for the benefit of each employee or retiree.
193
  Absent an identifiable fund 
“owned” by the pension recipient or the employee, such as perhaps an annuity purchased in the 
name of the recipient or a brokerage account in the name of the recipient, the fact that state and 
local pension promises might be considered “property” for due process purposes does not mean 
that they are protected by the Takings Clause from rejection or reduction in bankruptcy.   
However, even if there is no federal remedy available, state constitutional and statutory 
provisions, discussed above, may impose substantial impediments to state pension reform.  As 
noted, many states prohibit diminution of pension benefits for both retired workers and workers 
currently employed.  In such states, legislation or executive action purporting to reduce benefits 
may be declared null and void by state courts.  In these states, and in light of the possibility of 
federal civil rights injunctive relief, federal bankruptcy law may be necessary to bring about 
meaningful pension reform in some states.  However, as noted, most states do not allow their 
municipalities to employ bankruptcy to adjust their debts.  Whether courts in those states would 
prevent reform even in dire financial circumstances, remains, perhaps, to be seen. 
                                                 
192
 See In re Nolan, 232 F.3d 528, 534 n. 10 (6
th
 Cir. 2000) (“Every bankruptcy involves a ‘transfer’ of private 
property from a creditor to a debtor, in the sense that a creditor is involuntarily deprived of a previously-vested, 
legally-enforceable debtor obligation to return borrowed creditor property. However, mere reconciliation of debts 
among private entities does not normally constitute taking private property for public use.”)  In municipal 
bankruptcy, the “public use” requirement might be met, but the adjustment of claims would still not constitute a 
“taking.” 
193
 Even if there were some separable property interest that could be claimed by each public pension plan 
participant, ordinarily the interest would be protected only to the extent of its value at the time of bankruptcy.  See 
Skeel, supra note x at 698. 
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IV. Concluding observations 
The public pension crisis, in part, is a state and local analog to the spiraling federal debt.  
Without significant reform, state and local governments will have to devote increasingly large 
portions of their limited revenues to fulfilling pension promises that may have been made 
decades before.  We have already seen significant reductions in government services in states 
with high pension costs, such as California.  That state, which once boasted of the most 
comprehensive and inexpensive higher education system in the nation, is now finding it 
impossible, for example, to continue to offer sufficient community college slots for all students.  
Pension costs are a major contributor to California’s financial difficulties. 
The pension funding crisis is different from other forms of deficit spending because the it 
involves obligations to individuals, i.e. current and former government employees.  Most 
references to the “public pension crisis” are to the financial aspects of the problem.  This masks 
the most important crisis, the human crisis.  The vast majority of people receiving government 
pensions are not wealthy.  If many pension plans follow the lead of Central Falls, Rhode Island, 
there will be a crushing financial blow to many pension recipients, especially those who never 
participated in the federal social security system.  Most state and local pensions are relatively 
modest, and the workers and employers involved have contributed to their pensions the way that 
workers and employers in the private sector pay social security taxes and contribute to 401k 
accounts, often coupled with employer contributions.
194
  These workers have structured their 
                                                 
194
 State and local employers and employees contribute, on average, a total of 18.5 percent of salary to public 
pension funds covering employees not participating in social security (10.5 percent for the employer and 8 percent 
for the employee.)  Social security contributions for other workers total 12.4 percent, with employers and employees 
contributing 6.2 percent each.  See ALICIA H. MUNNELL & MAURICIO SOTO, CENTER FOR STATE AND LOCAL 
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finances and made career and personal decisions in reliance on their pension expectations.  
Reforms that involve significant reductions in pension payouts or large increases in employee 
pension contributions may appear to be unfair to the majority of workers who have not engaged 
in any significant manipulation of their pension entitlements.  Of course, when a private business 
goes into bankruptcy, many people’s legitimate expectations are upset, even people who cannot 
afford the losses they are forced to bear. 
In a sense, public pension recipients are in a similar position, but on the lower end of the 
economic scale, to the victims of Bernard Madoff’s ponzi scheme.  In many public pension 
funds, the level of contributions was established based on the expectation that the funds would 
earn 8 percent per year.  While average returns over the last 20 years or so may be in that range, 
over the last decade the returns have been closer to 6 percent, with a 3.2 percent annual return 
over the past 5 years.  In the fiscal year ending June 30th, the two largest California public 
pension funds earned 1 percent and 1.8 percent, while New York State’s largest fund earned 6 
percent in its fiscal year that ended in March, before significant market losses in the second 
quarter of 2012.  If returns remain well below the 8 percent level usually relied upon, 
underfunding will only get worse, and pension fund participants’ expectations will become more 
and more unrealistic. 
Another analog to the Madoff scandal is that these workers were likely led to believe that 
their employers were contributing to the pension fund, in amounts sufficient to fund the promises 
that were being made.  Just as Madoff’s victims received fabricated statements indicating 
                                                                                                                                                             
GOVERNMENT EXCELLENCE, ISSUE BRIEF: STATE AND LOCAL PENSIONS ARE DIFFERENT FROM PRIVATE PLANS 4 
(2007), available at http://crr.bc.edu/wp-content/uploads/2007/11/slp_1.pdf. 
Beermann, Public Pension Crisis, 9/23/2012 
 
78 
 
investment gains that did not exist, government workers were told what level of benefits they 
should expect, and that money was being set aside each month on their behalf. 
The fairness of significant reductions in pension benefits depends on a variety of 
considerations, including the magnitude of the contributions made by retirees and employees to 
the retirement system; the degree to which pensions were spiked in ways not related to the true 
earnings of the employees; the degree to which employees accepted lower current wages in 
exchange for generous retirement benefits; and the other ways in which employees structured 
their finances and their personal and professional lives around their pension expectations.  
Employees may have rejected other employment opportunities such as moving into higher 
paying private sector jobs without pension benefits and they may have saved less for retirement 
in reliance on their pensions.  These decisions are irrevocable for older workers and retirees who 
have insufficient (or no) remaining time in the work force to ameliorate the consequences of 
these decisions. 
Reforms may seem less unfair if pension promises were unrealistically generous in light 
of contributions to pension funds and true rates of return on pension fund investments.  
Reduction in benefits may not seem unfair if contributions similar to or slightly higher than those 
made to social security resulted in pension promises two, three, or four times higher than social 
security benefits that would have been earned in that program.
195
  If workers or their unions 
understood that their contributions were based on projected returns that were way out of line 
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 As noted above, public pension participants contribute somewhat more to their pension funds than the amounts  
required for participation in social security.  See supra note x.  Higher returns for public pension participants may be 
justified in part because those funds invest in the stock market, while social security funds are invested only in 
federal Treasury bills which earn a relatively low rate of return. 
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with the market, it might not seem unfair to make them bear some of the pain of the shortfall that 
has resulted, especially if government salaries are similar to or even higher than private sector 
salaries, as some analysts claim.  However, this ignores the inducement aspect of pension 
promises, that state and local workers were induced to accept and remain in their jobs in part 
based on the pension promises that were continually made during their employment. 
Reform may seem even less unfair when it is directed at activities that seem to fall into 
the general category of pension spiking.  Insofar as pension benefit calculations are inflated by 
including overtime, secondary jobs, longevity pay, and artificial promotions, reducing benefits 
may seem perfectly fair.  Public pensions should compensate employees fairly and provide 
economic security, they should not provide an opportunity to game the system.  Of course, rules 
in many areas of law are subject to manipulation, but it is generally not viewed as unfair when 
reforms are directed at issues properly characterized as “loopholes.” 
The Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court’s statement that changes to pension plans are 
constitutional if they are “reasonable and bear some material relationship to the theory of a 
pension system and its successful operation,” can help provide the basis for a general 
understanding of how the contractual underpinnings of contemporary pensions should be 
tempered to allow for reforms to abusive pension practices.  Government pensions are designed 
to provide financial security, incentives to faithful long-term government service, and to perhaps 
make up for the lower salaries of government employees, while providing for the reduced 
economic needs for retired workers as compared to people still active in the work force.   Under 
traditional, straightforward contract principles, employees can make a persuasive case that they 
should be able to take advantage of all of the features of the pension system in place during their 
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employment.  These could include provisions that enable pensions to be spiked based on second, 
part-time jobs, volunteer service, and longevity bonuses, designed simply to increase pensions.  
The Massachusetts court’s comment encourages viewing pension reform from the perspective of 
the goals and nature of a pension system rather than as a simple contractual arrangement.  
Amounts earned through “gaming” the system are inconsistent with the theory of a pension 
system.  No worker should have a legitimate expectation of a pension boosted by part-time work, 
end of career promotions, and longevity pay earned simply by informing the government 
employer that retirement is a year or more away. 
The simple contractual view is inconsistent with contemporary application of the 
Contract Clause.  Rather than simply disallow all retrospective modifications of the terms of both 
private and government contracts, the Supreme Court allows even substantial impairments of 
government contracts if they are supported by an important government interest.  This 
contemporary standard rejects a simplistic contractual view of government-citizen contractual 
relations in favor of a more realistic view, imbued with policy and analysis of the legitimacy of 
private expectations.   
In an odd sense, this is also theoretically consistent with the Supreme Court’s recent, 
somewhat surprising decision invalidating the expansion of Medicaid under the Affordable Care 
Act.
196
  In the Affordable Care Act, Congress specified that states must expand Medicaid 
eligibility on pain of the loss of all federal Medicaid funding, even for elements unrelated to the 
Affordable Care Act’s expansion of the program.  The Supreme Court rejected this provision on 
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 See Nat'l Fed'n of Indep. Bus. v. Sebelius, 132 S. Ct. 2566 (2012) (invalidating portions of Patient Protection and 
Affordable Care Act, Pub. L. No. 111-148, 124 Stat. 896 (Mar. 23, 2010)). 
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the ground that the states have established expansive subsidized health care programs for the 
poor in reliance on continued federal funding, and it would not be truly voluntary if states risked 
all of their funding by refusing to expand their programs to meet the Affordable Care Act’s 
standards.  On a purely contractual theory, the Court’s decision makes no sense.  The states have 
a clear and simple choice—provide Medicaid under the new law’s standards or forego Medicaid 
funding for the future.   This simplistic contractual perspective does not account for the 
expectations and networks of institutions that have grown up around federal Medicaid funding, 
which make it virtually inconceivable for any state to forego federal funding altogether.  
Similarly, if pension promises are viewed as the product of a corrupt or incompetent political 
system, then perhaps adjustments beyond those that would be tolerated on a strict contractarian 
view should be allowed. 
Reforms targeting abuses should be allowed under any theory.  Government employees 
may recognize that there are contractually-protected loopholes and devices that allow them to 
spike their pensions.  They also probably understand, however, that they are taking advantage of 
technicalities that go beyond the spirit of the government pension program.  A purely contractual 
view would not take this into account.  The core of pensions based on a person’s true long-term 
service and economic reliance should be protected, but contractual formalities should not prevent 
the closing of loopholes and the elimination of methods that allow pension spiking. 
Fairness aside, if the financial situation of government pension funds does not improve, 
many state workers and retirees may suffer severe reductions in their pension benefits as public 
entities find it economically or politically impossible to meet their obligations to retired workers.  
Municipalities may reduce pension benefits through bankruptcy and states may unilaterally 
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reduce benefits and use their unique positions as sovereign states to resist judicial remedies based 
on state or federal law.  These possibilities may give pension plan participants strong incentives 
to negotiate over their pension benefits, perhaps resulting in the acceptance of significant 
reductions that are less painful than what would have otherwise occurred. 
What might the future hold for the public pension systems?  While reflecting on the 
relative impecunity of government pension recipients and their legitimate expectations based on 
years of contributions and service, it is worth considering whether public pensions should be 
bailed out the way that financial institutions have been bailed out in the past.  According to the 
website propublica.com, 928 institutions have received more than $600 billion in federal bailout 
funds during the recent financial crisis.  This includes nearly $200 billion to the quasi-
governmental Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac, and nearly $70 billion to the insurance company, 
AIG.  Other large institutions receiving billions of dollars in bailout funds include General 
Motors, Bank of America, and Citigroup.
197
  There have been additional government bailouts in 
the United States, including the rescue of the City of New York in 1975, Chrysler Corp. in 1980, 
and the savings and loan industry in the late 1980s and early 1990s.  Perhaps the federal 
government should step in, in a cooperative plan with the states, and provide funds, loans, and 
other financing to bail out underfunded public pension funds.  If the government is willing to 
provide funds for mismanaged banks and insurance companies, why not for pension funds? 
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 See Bailout Recipients, PROPUBLICA, http://projects.propublica.org/bailout/list. 
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One modest proposed bailout of state and local pension funds is for the federal 
government to guarantee pension obligation bonds issue by states.
198
  Additional proposals in the 
same vein would provide federal guarantees or favorable tax treatment for such bonds on the 
condition that the state adopt certain austerity measures such as moving to defined contribution 
pension plans for new employees and fully funding existing defined benefit plans.
199
  These 
proposals are designed to relieve some of the fiscal pressure on state and local governments 
while preserving employees’ pensions. 
There are many practical reasons to be cautious about bailing out public pension funds.  
The most obvious is that it would be very expensive: in the trillions of dollars especially if health 
care promises to retirees are included.  It should be noted that according to the New York Times, 
the government’s total commitment of loans and other investments in the recent financial bailout 
may total more than $12 trillion,
200
 but still, in present circumstances, any request to spend 
trillions more would be greeted with great skepticism to say the least.  Further, bailing out 
hundreds of public pension funds would be a difficult and complex undertaking with enormous 
moral hazard implications.  Each of the hundreds of underfunded pension funds is underfunded 
to a different degree, and got there in its own way.  Some funds were abusive, with extravagant 
promises and minimal contributions, while others simply suffered from lackluster investment 
performance perhaps owing to unrealistic, but good faith, predictions.  Some large bureaucracy, 
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 See Debra Brubaker Burns, Note, Too Big to Fail and Too Big to Pay: States, Their Public-Pension Bills, and the 
Constitution, 39 Hastings Const. L.Q. 253, 276 (2011), citing Governor Pat Quinn, Illinois State Budget Fiscal Year 
2012 29 (2012), available at http://www2.illinois.gov/budget/Documents/FY%202012/FY12_ 
Operating_Budget.pdf and Dave McKinney, Top U.S. House Republican Rejects Federal Guarantee for Ill. 
Pensions, Chi. Sun-Times, Feb. 23, 2011, http:// www.suntimes.com/news/politics/3959464-418/top-u.s.-house-
republican-rejects-federal-guarantee-for-ill.-pensions.   
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 See Burns, Note, supra note x at 276-77. 
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 See Adding Up the Government’s Total Bailout Tab, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 4, 2009, available at 
http://www.nytimes.com/interactive/2009/02/04/business/20090205-bailout-totals-graphic.html. 
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like the Resolution Trust Corporation of the savings and loan crisis, but much larger, would have 
to be created, and standards would have to be developed to guide the treatment of the funds 
based on numerous variables.   
The moral hazard problem is also significant.  In some states and localities, corruption 
has contributed significantly to extravagant pension promises.  Unless serious consequences are 
attached to abusive behavior and effective controls are put in place, losses may continue after 
bailouts.
201
  We have seen this in what seems, at this point, to be a regularly occurring cycle of 
bailouts directed at financial institutions.  If state and local pension funds are too big to fail, their 
managers can continue with their untoward behavior, assured that the federal government will be 
there to pick up the pieces when things fall apart. 
Despite all of this, the human case in favor of a bailout is compelling. The Rhode Island 
legislature recognized this when it appropriated funds to cushion the blow suffered by Central 
Falls retirees.  The possibility of large numbers of retirees without sufficient pensions to stay out 
of poverty may not threaten to bring down the entire financial system, but it is a prospect that is 
contrary to the ideals established by the social security system, that the elderly should have 
sufficient resources to live out their remaining years with dignity.  Of course, there are 
competing demands for every government dollar, and in an era with no appetite for tax increases, 
spending on the elderly may come out of funds that might have been devoted to education or 
health care for children and the poor.  There are obviously no easy answers, but the possibility of 
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 For example, consider the multi-billion dollar trading losses suffered by JP Morgan Chase after it received (and 
paid back) $25 billion in federal bailout funds.  See Management shake-up at JPMorgan; Zames is COO, WALL ST. 
J., July 27, 2012, available at http://online.wsj.com/article/AP13f79c4fe0694aa49fc0f09df5446b30.html. 
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a large scale bailout should at least be part of the conversation.  Retirees are entitled to at least as 
much consideration as financial institutions and government bondholders. 
Looking at the more distant future, steps ought to be taken to avoid the possibility of this 
happening again.  Investment volatility and political considerations are likely to continue to 
threaten the financial viability of pension funds if they continue as currently structured.  As of 
yet, there has been no large scale movement in government away from benefit plans toward 
401k-style contribution plans.  This may be due to a combination of worker resistance and the 
financial difficulty of making the transition when underfunded pension plans need continued 
contributions to move toward actuarial soundness.
202
  In Massachusetts, for example, one 
element of pension reform is a long-term schedule for eliminating municipal pension 
underfunding by requiring higher municipal contributions until full funding is achieved 2025.
203
  
Assuming that no significant movement is made away from defined benefit plans toward 
contribution plans, reform is likely to include further attacks on pension spiking and a 
combination of reduced benefits and increased contributions from workers.  More states may 
require their workers to join the federal social security program and then scale down the size of 
pensions accordingly.  Health care benefits are likely to be cut by requiring greater contributions 
from retirees toward premiums, and by increasing co-pays and deductibles. 
One final thought.  The recent controversy over collective bargaining rights in Wisconsin 
and related events may lead some to believe that the public pension crisis is less about the 
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 MASS. GEN. LAWS ch. 32 § 22c.  It appears that the Massachusetts legislature altered the schedule in reaction to 
the stock market and general financial downturn of 2008. 
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problem of chronic underfunding of pensions, and more about the slow but steady elimination of 
economic security for middle class workers in the United States.  Public employment is the last 
bastion of unionized labor in the United States.  Unionized workers tend to earn higher salaries 
and benefits and enjoy greater job security than their non-unionized counterparts.  Perhaps 
because of this, many unionized jobs in the United States’ private sector have disappeared, with 
manufacturing leading the way.  Until now, relatively low level state and local employees have 
been able to remain in the middle class and have enjoyed economic security in retirement.  
Pension reform and elimination of collective bargaining rights could signal the end of that.
204
  It 
may be only a matter of time before the twentieth century is viewed by public workers as the 
good old days. 
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